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iAbstract
This thesis examines the role of fiscal stress on the size of the government spending
multiplier. First, it explores the dynamic consequences of empirically identified gov-
ernment spending shocks in Italy in a regime with high sovereign bond yield spreads
and a regime with low spreads. It finds that cumulative multipliers are lower when
sovereign risk spreads are high. Secondly, the thesis explains the empirical result of
small government spending multipliers in times of high levels of fiscal stress in the
context of a DSGE Model. In this model, an increase in government spending crowds
out private investment. A fragile banking sector and aggregate risk amplify the crowd-
ing out of investment sufficiently to imply small multipliers in the presence of fiscal
stress. Finally, I analyze the role of fiscal stress on the multiplier, when the economy is
at the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates and find that in this scenario, the
effect of fiscal stress is reversed and the government spending multiplier is large.
Zusammenfassung
Gegenstand dieser Dissertation ist die Rolle fiskalischen Stresses auf die Größe des
Staatsausgabenmultiplikators. Hierbei werden zuerst die Folgen von empirisch identi-
fizierten Staatsausgabenschocks in Italien untersucht. Dies geschieht sowohl in einem
Zustand mit hohen Risikospreads auf Staatsanleihen, als auch in einem Zustand mit
niedrigen Risikospreads. Das Resultat ist, dass kumulative Multiplikatoren kleiner
sind, wenn das Ausfallrisiko von Staatsanleihen hoch ist. Zweitens erklärt die Disserta-
tion dieses empirische Resultat im Rahmen eines DSGE Modells. Im Model verdrängt
ein Anstieg der Staatsausgaben private Investitionen. Der Verdrängungseffekt wird
durch fragile Banken und die Rolle aggregierten Risikos ausreichend verstärkt, so dass
fiskalischer Stress zu sehr kleinen oder sogar negativen Multiplikatoren führen kann.
Zuletzt untersuche ich die Rolle fiskalischen Stresses auf den Staatsausgabenmultip-
likator unter der Nebenbedingung, dass die nominale Zinsuntergrenze bei null bindet.
In diesem Szenario kann sich der Effekt fiskalischen Stresses ins Gegenteil verkehren
und der Staatsausgabenmultiplikator groß werden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone have revived
the debate on the size of the government spending multiplier. The disruption of
global financial markets had asymmetric consequences for the member countries of
the Eurozone. While the economies of some countries quickly recovered from the
crisis, others experienced a long-lasting economic depression, high unemployment,
and spiking sovereign risk spreads on their government bonds. As monetary policy
in the currency area is conducted on the union-wide level, its ability to address
country-specific challenges is impaired. In this environment, fiscal policy came into
the focus of the public policy debate. To restore confidence into the sustainability of
their public finances, countries that were facing steep increases on their sovereign
yield spreads, have been implementing large programs of fiscal austerity, that
included sizable cuts to government spending. These spending cuts have started a
controversial debate on their effects on aggregate output, or in other words, on the
government spending multiplier.
In a survey of the literature on the government spending multiplier, (Ramey, 2011a)
concludes that in the context of linear SVARs and estimated DSGE models, the
multiplier varies between 0.8 and 1.5. In recent years, the empirical and theoretical
literature on this topic has shifted attention to the notion that under certain
conditions, the size of the multiplier can either be much larger or much smaller,
or even negative. A well-known example is the contribution by (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2012), who estimate the effects of government spending shock in
the US using a smooth transition VAR. Their econometric framework allows them to
distinguish the effects of shocks in economic expansion from shocks in recessions.
They report cumulative multipliers over a time horizon of 20 quarters of -0.33 for
expansions and 2.24 for recessions.1 In the theoretical literature, it is a common
1For other examples of empirical studies of state-dependent multiplier see, e.g., (Baum et al., 2012),
(Batini et al., 2012), (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2014), (Ramey and Zubairy, 2014), (Jorda and Taylor,
2015)
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finding that exceptionally large government spending multipliers can be generated in
models, in which the zero lower bound on interest rates is binding.2 In the context
of the European debt crisis, (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013) prominently argue, that
the deep recession and the binding zero lower bound implied that “conditions for
larder-than-normal multipliers were ripe”.3
However, next to the deep recession and the close-to-zero monetary policy rate, fiscal
stress in the form of high debt-to-GDP ratios and high sovereign yield spreads was
another aspect that shaped the economic environment in the European sovereign
debt crisis. In contrast to the other two aspects, the presence of fiscal stress is typically
associated with small government spending multipliers. This thesis contributes to
the understanding of government spending multipliers in the Eurozone, and to the
literature on the determinants of the multiplier in general, by investigating the role of
fiscal stress for the size of the multiplier. In doing so, it emphasizes that the claim of
larger-than-normal multipliers should be taken with a grain of salt.
In the second chapter of my this thesis, I conduct an empirical investigation on the
impact of fiscal stress on the multiplier in Italy, and find that indeed the multiplier is
lower in Italy, when risk premiums of government bonds are high. In the third chapter,
I offer an explanation for this finding in the context of a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with leverage constrained and risk-averse banks. I argue
that banks restrict their credit supply in the face of higher fiscal stress, triggering a fall
in investment and a small multiplier. Finally, in the fourth chapter of the thesis, I show
within the context of the same model that the effect of fiscal stress on the government
spending multiplier can be reversed and that the multiplier can be large when the
economy is at the zero lower bound.
In the 1990’s, interest in the relationship between the state of public finances and
the fiscal multipliers was sparked by (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990) who showed in a
case study that fiscal contractions in Denmark and Ireland were associated with an
expansion of output. In panel data studies, (Alesina and Perotti, 1997), and (Perotti,
1999) confirm the possibility of an ’expansionary fiscal contraction’. (Perotti, 1999)
shows that government spending multipliers are much smaller, when debt-to-GDP
ratios are high. Against the backdrop of the Eurozone crisis, the debate around the
role of public finances on fiscal multipliers has been revived. (Perotti, 2011) and
(Guajardo et al., 2014) critically revisit the claim of expansionary fiscal contractions
2see, e.g., (Woodford, 2010), (Christiano et al., 2011), (Eggertson, 2011), (Eggertson and Krugman,
2012). For empirical support of this result, see (Miyamoto et al., 2016).
3During the Euro crisis the European Central Bank slowly lowered its main refinancing rate from 150
bp to 0bp. Absolute zero was only reached in March 2016. It is not entirely clear at which proximity to
the zero lower bound it has an effect on the multiplier.
3and find no evidence of negative multipliers. The result that higher levels of fiscal
stress, as measured by high debt-to-GDP ratios or public deficits are associated with
smaller government spending multiplier, has been confirmed, however, in several
panel data studies.4
The second chapter of my thesis, “Fiscal Retrenchment and Sovereign Risk”, adds
to the empirical literature on the link between fiscal stress and the government
spending multiplier. The design of the study in this chapter includes two novelties.
First, I use the sovereign bond yield spread as an indicator of fiscal stress, which
I argue to be a more accurate measure than the debt-to-GDP ratio or the public
deficit. Secondly, I employ the smooth transition VAR developed by (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2012), to analyze the dynamic consequences of identified shocks
to government spending in a regime with high fiscal stress and a regime with low
fiscal stress. This approach allows me to exploit all observations in my sample for the
estimation of either regime. For the analysis, I use Italian data between 1993Q3 and
2013Q2. The case of Italy is uniquely suited for this analysis, as Italy has experienced
high public debt for several decades, and recurrent period of high and volatile
interest rate spreads. An additional advantage of choosing this case is that, in my
sample, the correlation of sovereign yield spreads and output growth is small and
not statistically significant. This helps me to circumvent the problem that states of
high sovereign default risk are often associated with recessions, which are likely to
produce unusually large multiplier.5 As my sample furthermore does not feature
episodes, in which the monetary policy rate is zero, the effect of fiscal stress on
the government spending multiplier can be studied in relative isolation. I analyze
cumulative government spending multipliers over different time horizons and find
no evidence for an ’expansionary fiscal contraction’, i.e. for a negative multiplier.
However, I find that for horizons longer than 7 quarters, the government spending
multiplier is smaller in the sovereign risk regime that in normal times. Thus, using
a state of-the-art method, I confirm that the predominant finding in the literature
that high fiscal stress is associated with small government spending multipliers also
applies to Italy, a country, which stands at the center of the European debt crisis.
In my third chapter, “The Government Spending Multiplier, Fiscal Stress, and Risk”, I
take the result of the empirical literature as a starting point and develop a medium
scale DSGE model, that offers an explanation for how the presence of fiscal stress can
lead to small government spending multipliers. In the model, endogenously leverage
4see, e.g., (Corsetti et al., 2012), (Ilzetzki et al., 2013), and (Guajardo et al., 2014)
5In an analysis that is very similar to mine, (Born et al., 2015) construct a data set of interest-rate-
based measures of sovereign default risk of 38 countries and find that in times of high sovereign default
risk, multipliers are actually larger than in normal times. However, they admit that in their sample,
periods of sovereign risk are highly correlated with recessions, which are likely to contribute to large
multipliers.
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constrained banks à la (Gertler and Karadi, 2011) hold sovereign bonds on their
balance sheets, which are subject to default risk. In this setting, I analyze government
spending multipliers obtained by a first-order approximation, as well as a third-order
approximation to equilibrium dynamics using the non-linear moving average
approach by (Lan and Meyer-Gohde, 2013). Employing a third-order approximation
allows me to capture the effect of aggregate risk on the dynamic consequences of
the government spending shock and to account for the precautionary motive of the
agents in the economy.
To the extent that a positive shock to government spending increases the debt-to-GDP
ratio, it raises the degree of fiscal stress and exerts an adverse effect on the balance
sheet of banks holding the bonds. Consequently, it impairs the capability of banks in
the model to provide credit to firms, leading to reduced aggregate investment and
dampening the initial output stimulus of the shock. Thus, a crowding-out of invest-
ment via the banks’ balance sheets reduces the multiplier, and the more so, the higher
the initial degree of fiscal stress. However, I show that whether this effect is quantita-
tively relevant depends on the order of approximation up to which the model is solved.
While the impact of fiscal stress on the multiplier is negligible, when the model is
solved linearly, it is considerably amplified, when aggregate risk and the precautionary
behavior is accounted for. Key to this twist is the financial accelerator embedded in
the model, that is enhanced by the precautionary behavior of risk averse banks. An
expansion of government spending deteriorates the financial position of banks. When
they consider the risk of future, potentially also detrimental shocks to their balance
sheet, they reduce the exposure to risky assets more strongly. Consequently, in the
presence of fiscal stress, the fiscal expansion triggers stronger fire sales of assets, a
sharper contraction of the credit supply, a deeper fall of investment, and a smaller
government spending multiplier. Additionally, I show that the impact of fiscal stress
on the multiplier is particularly strong, when the government is highly indebted and
when banks are highly leveraged at the time of the fiscal expansion. In the extreme
case, the multiplier can even become negative.
Whereas chapters two and three of this thesis study the role of fiscal stress in isolation
from other potential determinants of the government spending multiplier, the fourth
chapter, “The Government Spending Multiplier, Fiscal Stress, and the Zero Lower
Bound”, investigates the multiplier in a setting, in which, next to fiscal stress, the
zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest is considered as a second feature of the
Eurozone crisis, which has been associated with unusual fiscal multipliers. During
the Euro crisis the European Central Bank only slowly lowered its main refinancing
rate from 150 bp to 0bp. Absolute zero was only reached in March 2016. It is not
5entirely clear at which proximity to the ZLB it has an effect on the multiplier. In the
investigation in this chapter, however, I adopt the perspective of (Blanchard and
Leigh, 2013) that the ZLB was relevant in the crisis. I conduct the analysis in the same
model that was developed in the third chapter with the only alteration that now the
nominal interest rate is required to be non-negative. To solve the model with the
occasionally binding constraint, I employ the piece-wise linear approach by (Guerrieri
and Iacoviello, 2015) and their software toolkit OccBin.
I find that despite the presence of fiscal stress, the multiplier is large at the ZLB.
The finding of the previous chapter, that the multiplier is lower, when the initial
degree of fiscal stress is higher, is reversed. Key to the mechanism that drives this
result is the role of the real interest rate at the ZLB. To force the economy to the
ZLB, I simulate a crisis shock that triggers a recession together with deflation.
When the nominal rate is zero, the expectations of a deflationary spiral translate
into a high real interest rate that causes a drop in aggregate investment. In this
scenario, an expansion of government spending, that raises aggregate demand
and increases inflation expectations, lowers the real interest rate, thereby actu-
ally stimulating investment and boosting aggregate output. The deeper the initial
crisis and the longer the duration of the ZLB episode, the larger is the output multiplier.
At the ZLB, the presence of fiscal stress has two effects. Since it makes banks more
vulnerable to the crisis shock, it deepens the recession and the deflation. Thus, the
inflationary impulse of the government spending shock counters a more severe
inflation and its stronger effect on the real interest rate stimulates investment and
output by more. Secondly, the large output response to the fiscal expansion actually
lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio, and thereby the measure of fiscal stress in the model.
Thus, declining fiscal stress contributes to increasing asset prices, relaxing the
leverage constraint of banks and enhancing their capability to supply credit. Hence,
I find that the multiplier is larger, the higher the initial degree of fiscal stress. For a
duration of the ZLB of 5 periods and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 1.3, as experienced by
Italy in the crisis, the cumulative government spending multiplier over a time horizon
of 20 quarters can be larger than two.
The differential results of the second and third chapter on the one hand, and the
fourth chapter on the other hand, highlight that the presence of fiscal stress has the
potential to either lower the government spending paper or to raise it, depending
on the underlying structure of the economy and other side conditions. Nesting the
analysis of the third and the fourth chapter is not straightforward, since the piece-wise
linear approach by (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015) to deal with the occasionally
binding ZLB constraint, only handles linearized equilibrium conditions, whereas the
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analysis in the third chapter requires a third order approximation to equilibrium
dynamics to capture the effects of risk. Adjusting the model to make it suitable for
a global solution method that allows to analyze more than one determinant of the
multiplier at a time, would be a natural next step in the investigation of the multiplier.
Fiscal stress, the deep recession, the ZLB, the instability of the financial sector,
capital flight out of several countries, and political uncertainty are only some factors
that might have had an important impact on the size of the government spending
multiplier during the sovereign debt crisis. Against this background, and considering
the relevance of the research question, a further investigation of the size of multipliers
in the Eurozone presents an important and fruitful field for further research.
On the methodological side, a common theme of this thesis is the use of non-linear
methods to flesh out the effects of fiscal stress on the multiplier. That these methods
have been developed in recent years, reflects that the Great Recession and the Euro-
pean debt crisis have sparked a growing awareness of the state dependence and the
non-linearity of the consequences of monetary and fiscal policy shocks. By taking
advantage of the methodological progress and investigating the role of fiscal stress,
this thesis takes a step in the direction of a more complete understanding of the
government spending multiplier.
Chapter 2
Fiscal Retrenchment and Sovereign
Risk
Abstract
How does sovereign risk affect the dynamic consequences of identified
contractionary government spending shocks? I apply a regime-switching
SVAR on Italian data and find that in periods in which government bond
yield spreads are high, cumulative government spending multipliers
are smaller than in the calm regime. This empirical finding supports
theoretical arguments that associate fiscal distress with low multipliers (e.g.
Corsetti et al. (2013)). An additional result is that in the crisis regime, risk
spreads increase after contractionary government spending shocks. This
challenges the suggestion that declining risk premiums are the reason for
the attenuated output response in the crisis regime.
Keywords: Government Spending Multipliers, Sovereign Risk, Fiscal Dis-
tress, Fiscal Retrenchment
JEL Classification: E32, E62, E63, H60
2.1 Introduction
In the recent years, sovereign bond yields have spiked in several countries in
the eurozone, signaling the risk of impending sovereign defaults. As a reaction,
these countries are running programs of fiscal retrenchment cutting government
expenditures with the goal to consolidate their public finances. The effects of fiscal
policy depend on the economic conditions under which it is conducted. One of the
most important fiscal policy tools is government spending. As turmoil in the sovereign
bond markets has been an important feature of the economic environment in the
eurozone, a natural question to ask is: How does the presence of sovereign risk affect
the dynamic consequences of government spending shocks?
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This paper identifies empirical government spending shocks and shocks to
the growth rate of public debt applying the regime-switching STVAR approach,
developed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). This technique allows for
differences in the impulse responses to identified shocks across a crisis and a
calm regime, focussing on the interaction of government spending, output and
the sovereign risk spread. In the sovereign risk crisis regime, sovereign bond yields
are high and volatile, indicating uncertainty in the financial market about the
sustainability of public finances. While often sovereign risk is associated with low
output growth, which itself has an influence on the effectiveness of fiscal policy1,
in the case of Italy, correlation between the growth rate of GDP and the risk spread
measure I apply to separate the regimes is small and insignificant. This prevents the
difference of the government spending multipliers in the two regimes from being
driven by output growth dynamics, and allows me to study in isolation the influence
of sovereign risk on multipliers as a particular determinant.
In a comparison of the effects across regimes, I find that the cumulative gov-
ernment spending multipliers over a horizon of 7 or more quarters are smaller in a
sovereign risk crisis than in the calm regime, providing evidence for a dampening
impact of the presence of sovereign risk on the effects of government spending shocks.
Impact multipliers do not differ significantly across regimes. An additional result is
that after a negative government spending shock in the crisis regime, the risk spread
on government bonds rises on impact, presenting a challenge to the hypothesis that
fiscal retrenchment calms down financial markets.
The finding of a weaker output response to fiscal retrenchment in times of
sovereign risk, presents evidence which is in line with theoretical considerations on
fiscal multipliers in the presence of strained public finances. The strongest statement
in this regard in the theoretical literature is the expansionary fiscal contraction
hypothesis (EFC), which posits the possibility that fiscal multipliers can even be
negative. Much of the arguments of the proponents of this hypothesis relies on the
idea, that fiscal consolidation may restore the credibility of public the government’s
commitment for sustainable finances, thus creating a more stable environment for
the economy. In such a case a cut of government spending may over-proportionally
crowd in private demand (see e.g. Bertola and Drazen (1993), Alesina and Perotti
(1997)). Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993) and Sutherland (1997) argue
that when agents perceive the current fiscal path to be unsustainable, a pronounced
fiscal consolidation may over-proportionally crowd in consumption. More recently
and motivated by the crisis in the Eurozone, Corsetti et al. (2013), focus on the
effect of fiscal retrenchment in the presence of sovereign risk. In the context of a
1see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Baum et al. (2012) Batini et al. (2012)
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New Keynesian model with financial frictions they find that to the extent, that a
fiscal contraction decreases risk premiums on public debt, it facilitates financial
intermediation and thus stimulates lending and investment, thereby dampening
the contractive effects of fiscal consolidations.2 Similarly, van der Kwaak and van
Wijnbergen (2015) show that in a model with financial frictions à la Gertler and Karadi
(2011) sovereign risk can lower the government spending multiplier substantially.
While I do not find not find government spending multipliers, my findings are
consistent with the general notion, that the presence of fiscal stress attenuates the
effects of fiscal retrenchment. However, the initial increase in the spread is at odds
with arguments that rely on a decline of risk premiums.
The empirical literature on state-dependent multipliers has been growing in
the last years. Closest to my paper are Born et al. (2015). They investigate on the
difference of government spending multipliers in times of high and low fiscal stress in
a panel of countries. For this, they employ a panel smooth transition autoregressive
model which, like the STVAR, allows for differences in the impulse responses to
identified fiscal shocks across a crisis and a calm regime. They base their indicator
for fiscal stress on default risk spreads is based on global bond and CDS data. They
find that a negative government spending shock lowers output in the risk regime, and
expands output in the calm regime. With regard to the default premium they find that
fiscal retrenchment increases the premium in the crisis regime. The latter finding
is in line with my results. My analysis differs from theirs in some key aspects. The
main difference is that, I study the case of a single country, namely Italy, instead of
a panel of country. As the literature shows, the heterogeneity of fiscal multipliers
across countries is substantial. Thus, the focus on a specific country is likely to add
information to the pooled results of a panel analysis. Additionally, while Born et al.
(2015) document that typically sovereign risk spreads tend to be negatively correlated
with output growth, Italy represents a case, in which sovereign risk spreads and
output growth are only weakly correlated, enabling me to separate the influences of
recessions and sovereign risk on the multiplier.
Further papers that are close to mine in their motivation are Perotti (1999), Corsetti
et al. (2012) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013), who investigate on the difference of government
spending multipliers in times of high and low fiscal stress in a panel of countries.
These authors find that the multipliers are lower, when the fiscal stress is high. The
main difference between the approach of my paper and these studies is that they use
2In the model by Corsetti et al. (2013) a prerequisite for the relation between the fiscal multiplier
and sovereign risk is that monetary policy does not act to no neutralize the effects of risk premiums
on lending condition. The authors model monetary policy to be at the zero lower bound. In most of
my sample, monetary policy is not constrained. However, in those periods in my sample, in which the
volatility of bond yields is most pronounced, the central bank either does not lower the policy rates, or
the policy rate is very close to the ZLB such that monetary policy does not have much leeway.
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the debt-to-GDP ratio or the public deficit as indicators of fiscal stress. However, debt
measures can only be imperfect proxies to sovereign risk. Naturally, the sustainability
of public finances does not rely on the public debt measure alone, but also on factors
such as, for example, the monetary policy regime, the exchange rate regime, output
growth, political risk, and non-fundamental factors. Exploiting the sovereign bond
yield has the advantage that, in principle, it should reflect the expectations of market
participants about all relevant factors, making it a more comprehensive measure of
sovereign risk. Corsetti et al. (2012) find the differences between the multipliers in the
regime to be rather small, whereas Perotti (1999) finds it to be sizable. Ilzetzki et al.
(2013) even find evidence for large, negative long-run fiscal multipliers in their group
of high debt countries.
Empirical studies, which find evidence supporting the expansionary fiscal
contraction hypothesis, analyze episodes of fiscal consolidation in the 1980s, mainly
with a focus on Denmark (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Perotti (1997),
Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Bergman and Hutchison (2010)). In these episodes, they
find evidence for a stimulating effect of fiscal retrenchment. Alesina and Perotti
(1997) reach a similar conclusion for a panel of OECD countries. More recently, some
studies have cast some doubt on these empirical results. Perotti (2011) discusses
expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation for episodes in Denmark, Ireland, Sweden
and Finland, and finds that only in the first case domestic demand was stimulated,
while in the other three increased exports were driving output growth. In a panel
of OECD countries Guajardo et al. (2014) identify fiscal shocks with the narrative
approach and do not find evidence which would support the EFC.
While theoretical arguments and empirical studies link fiscal distress with
lower fiscal multipliers than in normal times, larger-than-normal multipliers are
typically associated with situations, where the economy is at the zero lower bound
(see, e.g. Christiano et al. (2011) and Eggertson and Krugman (2012)) or recessions
(see, e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Baum et al. (2012) and Batini et al.
(2012)). Referring to these studies, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) state that ”conditions
for larger-than-normal multipliers were ripe” in Europe, and suggest that the fiscal
impact multipliers during the Eurozone crisis were potentially far higher than 1.0. As
my study focusses on sovereign risk instead of output growth dynamics, and since as
mentioned above the correlation between output growth and the volatility measure
is close to zero, the low fiscal multipliers that I find in the sovereign risk regime do
not contradict the results of the studies that focus on the effect of fiscal policy in
recessions. However, they cast a very different light on the effects of fiscal policy in the
eurozone crisis.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section two discusses the
choices of the sovereign risk indicator as well as the sample period with regard to
fiscal developments in Italy. Section three outlines the econometric methodology. The
fourth section presents the results of the analysis. Section five concludes.
2.2 Sovereign risk and the case of Italy
The case of Italy provides an ideal case for the analysis of sovereign risk for several
reasons. Italy has had a long history of high sovereign debt. As can be seen in the
lower panel of figure (2.1), its debt-to-GDP ratio has been higher than 100 percent
for two decades, and it experienced several periods of high and volatile risk spreads.
Nonetheless, it did not experience a default event that would have resulted in a
structural break in the pricing of default risk. Thus, Italy represents the rare case for
which time-series data of sufficient length is available to analyze sovereign risk in
conjunction with macroeconomic dynamics. In the empirical analysis, I use quarterly
data for the period 1993Q3-2013Q2. Sovereign risk enters the study in two ways.
First, the sovereign risk indicator used as a variable in the VAR is the real interest
rate spread of Italian government securities with a five-year term over German
Bunds with the same term. Secondly, a moving average of the spread is used to
distinguish two regimes. The regime with high and low real interest rate spreads are
labeled crisis regime and calm regime, respectively. These choices are discussed below.
The sample starts in 1993Q3. Data on Italian sovereign bond yields is avail-
able as of 1978. However, at that time the secondary market for Italian Treasury bills
was very tightly regulated (see Frattiani and Spinelli (1997), Vercelli and Fiordoni
(2003)) and the bond yields were managed by the fiscal and monetary policy makers.
The central bank actively participated in government bond auctions. Banks were
required to hold a fixed percentage of their new flow of deposits in government bonds,
which was regularly adjusted by the authorities. Strict capital controls were in place,
and the discount rate was set by the Treasury instead by the Italian central bank.
During the 1980s and until the beginning of the 1990s, the Italian policy mix shifted
considerably from fiscal dominance towards an empowerment of the central bank,
and the financial sector underwent a step-wise liberalization. Portfolio restriction for
banks disappeared in 1987. Capital and exchange rate controls were fully abolished in
May 1990 (Frattiani and Spinelli (1997)). In 1992, the central bank was granted the
right to set the discount rate. The shift in the Italian monetary policy regime was part
of the plan to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and, eventually, to
introduce the Euro. Yet, as monetary policy became more restrictive, fiscal policy was
slow to adjust, and kept running large deficits. The stock of public debt, which grew
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rapidly in the 1980s, exceeded the Italian GDP for the first time in 1992. Throughout
the whole sample period, the Italian debt-to-GDP ratio is above 100 percent. Thus,
Italy represents a country, which is being confronted with fiscal vulnerability for more
than two decades. Small changes in the interest rate of government yields have a
sizable effect on the debt service of Italy. In the view of this situation, explaining the
periods of high and volatile bond yield spreads with sovereign default risk is plausible,
and excluding the 80s and first years of the 90s, ensures that fluctuations in the
bond yields are not distorted by active management by policy makers. An additional
distortion to the bond yield as a sovereign risk measure is the influence of exchange
rate risk. In 1992, speculative attacks forced several countries to depreciate their
currencies below the narrow bands around the Deutsche Mark that were instituted
in the ERM. While the interest rate differentials between most European sovereign
bonds and German Bunds increased, the Italian-German interest rate differential
spiked higher than most. It then decreased again in the beginning of 1993 after the lira
had depreciated against the Deutsche Mark by roughly 25 percent. The high bond
spreads in Europe at that time are typically explained with exchange rate risk instead
with sovereign risk. Hence, I discard the observations before 1993Q3 from the sample,
to ensure that the risk drives Italian bond yields is mainly credit risk. However, also
for the other years prior to 1999, fluctuations in yield are affected by exchange rate
movements.
By subtracting the inflation differential of Italy and Germany from the nominal
yield spread of Italian bond with a five year maturity over German bonds with the
same maturity, I construct a simple an ex-post real interest rate spread to capture
sovereign risk in the VAR. 3 Regarding the high nominal yield spreads in the 90s
of the European countries, cases have been made for sovereign credit risk, as well
as for devaluation risk, driven by fears about high inflation, as drivers of the bond
yield spreads (see Wright (2014)). However, in a study of asset swap data of these
countries, Codogno et al. (2003) find that security yield spreads of Italy and Spain
stand out, insofar as they were driven almost entirely by the underlying default
risk. The third panel in figure (2.1) shows the difference between the spread used in
this study, and the nominal spread. Between 1993Q3 and 1997Q4 the real interest
rate spread is consistently lower than the nominal spread. The closer the date of
the accession to the Euro comes, the smaller is the gap between the two spreads,
and in the quarters directly before the accession, the gap is virtually closed. After
3Yang (2007) finds that the inclusion of forward looking variables into a fiscal SVAR with the
Blanchard-Perotti identification scheme, reduces the size of the multiplier. She interprets this as
tentative evidence for fiscal foresight. This paper does not address the invertibility problem, that comes
along with fiscal foresight and which is carefully explained by Leeper et al. (2008). However, the inclu-
sion of the forward looking spread, should to some degree mitigate this problem (see Sims and Zha
(2006)), while partly accounting for the low fiscal multipliers that I find.
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Figure 2.1: Real log government expenditures (seasonally adjusted), real log GDP (seasonally
adjusted), real and nominal interest rate spreads of 5-year Italian government bonds over
German bonds, and the debt-to-GDP ratio
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the accession to the Euro, the exchange rate risk is systematically eliminated, the
inflation risk becomes irrelevant, and the real spread and the nominal spread coincide.
Two periods in the sample feature particularly high bond yield spreads. The
first one is in 1994, shortly before the still growth of public debt halted and the
Italian debt-to-GDP ratio reached its maximum (see figure (2.1)). In this year the
non-partisan government led by Carlo Azeglio Ciampo, who, as the former governor
of the central bank had led the period of disinflation in the 80s, and was regarded as
committed to fiscal consolidation, was replaced in the elections. The new government
coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi only lasted for a few months and collapsed in
December 1994.
Additional to this political instability, which threatened to undermine fiscal consolida-
tion, Borio and McCauley (1998) ascribe the increased volatility in the Italian bond
markets at the same time to the experience of the Mexican peso crisis, which made
investors unwilling to finance potentially unsustainable public debt. A smaller peak
of the spread can be observed in 1997, before it became clear that the government
would be accepted in the first round of accession to the Euro area. In this year, the
Italian Treasury announced a seven percent primary surplus and, thus, demonstrated
a commitment to decrease the public debt. The second period with particularly
high bond yield spreads represents the high-time of the recent eurozone crisis,
around 2012. This period was preceded by a financial crisis in several countries and a
slump of the world economy in 2009. The risk of an impending sovereign default in
Greece quickly spilled over to other European countries, including Italy, where the
debt-to GDP ratio was rising again. While other countries in Europe suffered from
bursting housing bubbles or collapses of major banks, the banking system at that time
appeared to be relatively stable in Italy. Hence, while bank rescue measures heavily
contributed to the public debt in other countries in Europe, Italy spent only small
amounts on bank aid in crisis times. The contribution of bank rescue measures to
official public debt in Italy have only been roughly 4bn Euro.4
The second sovereign risk indicator in this study determines the choice of the regime.
Here, I use a lagged three quarter moving average of the real interest spread described
above. This choice ensures that the indicator is not driven by contemporaneous
shocks. Furthermore, it allows me to limit outlier effects of observations with
particularly high spreads, and to smooth the dynamics of the states and make the
estimation feasible. The structural break that the accession to the Euro area arguably
presents will hence be captured, by a marked decline in the sovereign risk indicator,
which pushes the economy towards the calm regime.
4 Financial guarantees to the financial sector, which, did not affect the debt of the general gov-
ernment were larger, yet, measured in percentage of GDP, still small in comparison to other cases in
Southern Europe. (see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/excessive-
deficit/supplemtary-tables-financial-crisis)
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The deepest recessions in the sample period are in 2009, in the aftermath of
the subprime crisis in the US, and in 2002 after the dot-com bubble. Notably, periods
of higher spreads do not necessarily coincide with periods lower output growth. More
importantly, as mentioned above, output growth and sovereign risk are virtually
uncorrelated. In the sample, the crisis indicator and the growth rate of output are
virtually uncorrelated. The correlation between GDP growth and the risk spread is at
-0.166 and is statistically insignificant at a significance level of 5%. The correlation
between GDP growth and the sovereign risk indicator, which separates the regimes,
is at -0.099 and is statistically insignificant at a significance level of 10%. Hence, the
difference between my results in the crisis and in the calm regime will not be driven
by underlying business cycle movements.
2.3 Econometric Methodology
The three variables used in the VAR are the general government final consumption
expenditures, GDP and the bond yield spread, discussed above, in the quarters
1993Q3-2013Q2. The nominal series for government consumption and GDP are
deflated using the GDP deflator. 5 I demean all variables and remove a linear quadratic
trend from real government consumption and real GDP.
As an econometric framework, I employ the smooth transition vector autoregression
method (STVAR) developed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). This method
models the economy as fluctuating between two states, which in this application are
simply labelled ”crisis regime” and ”calm regime”. Each period the economy is to a
certain degree (or probability) in one state and to a degree in the other.6 The degree to
which the economy is in a crisis or in a calm regime is determined by an underlying
state variable.7 This approach has the advantage that in the estimation for each regime
it exploits all observations. The estimation and inference results are thus more stable
than SVARs estimated separately for each state which - in the study at hand - would
5The series for general government final consumption expenditures, nominal GDP and the GDP
deflator are from stats.OECD (Series: B1_GE, Measures CARSA and DOBSA). The first two are already
seasonally adjusted. The series for the Italian interest rate for government bonds with a five-year term
stem from the Banca di Italia (Series: MFN_BMK.D.020.922.0.EUR.205), and their German counterpart
stems from the Bundesbank (Series: BBK01.WZ9816)
6In this aspect it differs from the threshold VAR (TVAR) approach, which assigns to each observation a
regime, based on an estimation of the threshold, which separates the different regimes. While the TVAR
is an interesting alternative, I prefer to take a more moderate stand on whether particular observations
belong to the calm or the crisis regime.
7For the question at hand, this is an advantage over time-varying coefficient models (TVC), as in the
latter approach the variation of the coefficients is unrelated to the state of the economy (see Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012)).
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be based on relatively few observations in each state. The STVAR approach allows for
the contemporaneous responses to structural shocks and for the dynamic responses
to differ across states. As discussed, the state variable which determines, in to what
degree the economy is in which state, will be three-quarter moving average of the
intra-quarter volatility of the yield of Italian government bonds with a five-year term.
The econometric specification reads:
X t = (1−F (zt ))ACA(L)X t−1+F (zt )ACR(L)X t−1+ut (2.1)
ut ~ N (0,Ωt ) (2.2)
Ωt = ΩCA(1−F (zt ))+ΩCRF (zt ) (2.3)
F (zt ) = exp(−γzt )
1+exp(−γzt )
, γ> 0 (2.4)
var (zt ) = 1; E(zt )= 0, (2.5)
where X t = [D t ,Yt ,St ]′, and D t , Yt and St are the measures for debt, GDP and the
spread, as discussed above. The lag polynomial in (1) is a weighted average of the
lag polynomials in the calm and in the crisis state (ACA(L) and ACR(L), respectively).
The VAR is estimated with two lags.8 The weights are determined by the function
F (zt ), depending on the state variable, denoted by zt , and the parameter γ. Ωt is
the covariance matrix of the residual vector, ut , and is also a state weighted average
of its state dependent counterparts. The functional form of F (zt ) is chosen such its
values are bounded between 0 and 1. Thus, the weighted sum spans a continuum of
states between the calm state and the crisis state as extremes with the function values
F (zt )≈ 0 and F (zt )≈ 1, respectively. The state variable, zt is demeaned and its variance
is normalized to 1. Figure (2.2) shows the crisis weights in the sample period. Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012) point out that, although, in principle, it is possible to
estimate {γ,ACA(L),ACR(L),ΩCA,ΩCR } simultaneously, such an identification of γ is
not reliable as the value of the parameter depends on non-linear moments and may
hence be sensitive to few observations.9 This is particularly relevant for this study, as
the sample period is quite short. Accordingly, I search a grid of different fixed values
for γ, and estimate {ACA(L),ACR(L),ΩCA,ΩCR } conditional on γ. The larger the value
of γ, the more pronounced the weight differences between calm and crisis times. For
values above 3, the dynamics are stationary, and the median responses to shocks are
robust to changes in the parameter value. In the baseline calibration I use γ= 4.
8This is in accordance with the SIC criterion for a linear VAR.
9In several trial runs, I found that the mean estimate for γ is sensitive to the initial condition of the
parameters and does not converge even in very long chains.
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Figure 2.2: Fz - Weight on the crisis regime
The maximum likelihood estimation uses the MCMC approach by Chernozhukov and
Hong (2003) for estimation and inference. Since the chains converge only slowly to
stationary distributions, I use 200,000 draws for the estimation of the baseline specifi-
cation and the robustness estimates and discard the first third of the chain. Further
details of the estimation method are provided in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)
and Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). Confidence intervals for the impulse response
functions are bootstrapped as in Caggiono et al. (2014).
In the identification of the government spending shocks in each regime, I follow Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002), and exploit the fact that the fiscal authorities react to changes
in economic conditions such as interest rates and output with a delay. Fiscal policy
measures need to be prepared by the executive branch of the government, discussed
within the government, the ruling parties, and finally in the parliament. When they are
passed by the legislative, it takes additional time to implement these policies. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that any discrete policy measures that are undertaken in
response to shocks to the sovereign risk premium or output shocks are not yet effective
in the quarter in which the shock hits. Hence, I use a recursive identification with
government spending ordered first.
2.4 Results
Figure (2.3) shows the impulse responses to a contractionary government spending
shock. The shock has the magnitude of 1 percentage point. The median responses
are plotted as solid lines, and the dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals
for the horizon of 20 quarters after the shocks. Note, that while the crisis weights for
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the Italian economy vary over the sample period, impulse response functions are
simulated for the illustrative extreme cases of the crisis regime F (zt )= 1 and the calm
regime F (zt )= 0. Responses are plotted in blue for the calm regime and in red for the
crisis regime.
The second row of figure (2.3) shows the responses of median output. Output
reacts stronger to the government spending shock in the calm regime than in the
crisis regime. The impact response in the calm regime is slightly stronger than in the
crisis regime. In the calm regime, output returns briefly to its initial level before falling
again more persistently in the third quarter. The maximum drop of median output
is reached after two years at -0.19%. The response in the crisis regime is markedly
different. Here median output also falls after the fiscal contraction, but the drop
reaches its maximum at -0,18% already after 4 quarters before the recessionary impact
of the shock fades out.
The persistence of the reaction of government spending to the shock is roughly similar.
As a consequence, in the crisis regime, the median cumulative multiplier is smaller
than in the calm regime for time horizons longer than 7 quarters. This difference
becomes significant after two and a half years after the shock.
Table 2.1: Cumulative Government Spending Multipliers
ΣhYh/ΣhGh* Crisis Regime Calm Regime
Horizon 5th %ile median 95th %ile 5th %ile median 95th %ile
1 quarter -0.025 0.412 0.829 0.254 0.559 0.872
1 year 0.467 1.119 1.745 -0.241 0.488 1.263
2 years 0.397 1.053 1.641 0.222 1.213 2.494
3 years 0.391 1.080 1.678 0.397 1.814 3.601
*Accumulated change in GDP (in Euro) per accumulated change in government spending (in Euro)
Table (1) shows the government spending impact multipliers and the cumulative
multipliers for the horizon of one, two and three years, measured as change in output
in Euro per change in government spending in Euro. The median impact multipliers
are with 0.412 (crisis regime) and 0.559 (calm regime) relatively small for both regimes.
After the first year the cumulative multiplier in the crisis regime is even larger than
in the calm regime, however, the differences are not significant at the 5%-level.
Reflecting the longer recession in the calm regime, for a time horizon of two years the
cumulative multiplier in the calm regime (1.213) is larger than in the crisis regime
(1.053). The longer the time horizon, the more pronounced the difference becomes.
At the horizon of three years, the difference between the cumulative multipliers is
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response of government spending, real GDP, and the sovereign risk spread
to a 1 percentage point increase in government spending. The dashed lines show the 95%
confidence intervals that are bootstrapped as in Caggiono et al. (2014).
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substantial (1.814 and 1.080) and statistically significant.
The smaller cumulative multipliers in the crisis regime show that the presence of
sovereign risk attenuates the effects of fiscal consolidations on output. This result can
be taken as supportive evidence for theoretical arguments that make the case that
fiscal retrenchment is less harmful, when the fiscal sustainability is in doubt. While I
do not find support for negative multipliers, as claimed by the EFC, my results are
consistent with the attenuated output response in the models by Corsetti et al. (2013)
and van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen (2015).
The weaker output response in the crisis regime in Italy is at odds with the findings
by Born et al. (2015), who find positive multipliers in the crisis regime and negative
multipliers in the calm regime for a panel of countries. A potential explanation
for the difference between their finding and mine is that the correlation between
output growth and sovereign risk in Italy is relatively weak compared to the average
correlation within their sample. This makes my results less likely to be affected by
recessionary periods that often come with typically come along periods of high
sovereign risk spreads, and tend to increase government spending multipliers.
Empirical studies, which assess the influence of high public debt on the effect of fiscal
shocks in panels of countries, find strong differences for low-debt and high-debt
countries. For instance, in their panel SVAR, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that for the
high-debt countries in their sample, the long-run fiscal multiplier is roughly minus
three, while for low-debt countries it is minus 0.36. Perotti (1999) finds that higher
debt lowers the impact multiplier by 1.61. Although the difference between the
cumulative multipliers that I find across regimes is smaller than in these studies, it is
qualitatively consistent with their results.
Notably, in the crisis regime the risk spread increases, in direct response to a fiscal
contraction. This is at odds with the common assumption in the theoretical literature
that the risk spread on government bonds decreases with the decline in debt which
should come along with fiscal retrenchment. However, the higher spread in response
to a persistent negative government spending shock is in line with the corresponding
result by Born et al. (2015). A possible explanation is that the fiscal contractions under-
taken by the Italian government in crisis periods were not judged to be sufficient to
restore investors confidence in the sustainability of public finances. Also, the increase
in the spread could potentially capture an increase in political instability in conse-
quence of the contractionary shock, as austerity typically weakens the popularity of
the government and is associated with a higher instability of coalitions in the parlia-
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ment.10. While the design of this study is unable to provide a conclusive explanation
of the rise in the risk spread, this finding contradicts explanations of the attenuated
output response to the fiscal contraction that hinge on a decline on risk premiums in
the economy (see, e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Corsetti et al., 2013).
2.5 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to characterize the dynamic effects of a contractionary
government spending shock during and outside a sovereign risk crisis. This study
presents empirical evidence which should serve as a stepping stone for understanding
the working of fiscal policy in a sovereign risk crisis. From the econometric analysis I
draw the following main conclusions.
The contractionary impact on output of fiscal retrenchment in the form of a negative
shock to government spending, is weaker in crisis times than outside sovereign risk
crises. I find that while impact multipliers are close to zero and insignificant for
both regimes, for a time horizon longer than seven quarters, the median cumulative
multipliers are lower in the crisis regime. With regard to the current eurozone crisis,
my results give a different picture of government spending multipliers in crisis
than studies that focus on the influence of underlying output dynamics, instead
on variations in sovereign risk. When assessing the effects of fiscal retrenchment, it
is recommended to keep both empirical results in mind. The results of this paper
serve to emphasize the role of sovereign risk, as an additional determinant for the
effectiveness of fiscal policy. Secondly, I find that the risk spread rises in response to a
fiscal contraction in the crisis regime, challenges the argument, that in times of fiscal
distress, fiscal contractions may stabilize the economy through a decline in the risk
premiums.
Caveats of this study are the short sample and that I focus exclusively on Italian data.
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) and Baum et al. (2012) find vastly different fiscal multipliers for
different countries. It is likely that the same heterogeneity across countries applies for
fiscal multipliers in sovereign risk periods. However, the focus on sovereign risk makes
an analysis of other countries difficult, as Italy presents the rare case of a country with
a prolonged history of sovereign risk, no default, and available data for this time. While,
my results are thus not one-to-one transferrable to other countries, they can serve
as supportive evidence for theoretical arguments that link the presence of sovereign
risk to lower fiscal multipliers. With the growing availability of longer time-series
of macroeconomic and fiscal data for a larger group of countries, it will be fruitful
to investigate further into the relation between sovereign risk and the size of fiscal
multipliers, and to compare the results for different countries and fiscal instruments.
10As mentioned, Italy saw three different government coalitions in the crisis year of 1994.

Chapter 3
The Government Spending Multiplier,
Fiscal Stress and Risk
Abstract
According to a growing empirical literature, the government spending mul-
tiplier appears to be relatively small in times of fiscal stress. I employ a
medium-scale DSGE model with leverage constrained banks and sovereign
default risk to analyze how the presence of fiscal stress can affect the trans-
mission of government spending shocks. I find that the role of fiscal stress
for the size of the government spending multiplier is negligible when ana-
lyzing the linearized economy. When the model is solved using a third-order
approximation to equilibrium dynamics, however, and the effects of risk on
the transmission of a government spending shock are therefore accounted
for, the presence of fiscal stress can lead to a substantial decrease of the
government spending multiplier, which is in line with the empirical evi-
dence. For plausible calibrations of the model, the cumulative multiplier
can even become negative.
Keywords: Government spending multiplier; Fiscal stress; Aggregate risk;
Financial frictions
JEL Classification: E32, E 44, E62, H30, H60
3.1 Introduction
During the recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone several European countries
have experienced sharp increases of their debt-to-GDP ratios and their sovereign
bonds yields. To strengthen the sustainability of their public finances, these countries
started programs of fiscal consolidation which included steep government spending
cuts. This raises the question: How does fiscal stress affect the size of the government
spending multiplier? A number of empirical papers find that the government
spending multiplier is smaller, when public finances are weak.1 This paper propose a
1See, e.g., (Perotti, 1999), (Corsetti et al., 2012) and (Ilzetzki et al., 2013)
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medium scale DSGE model that offers an explanation for this empirical link between
the degree of fiscal stress and the size of the government spending multiplier.
A key feature of this model are endogenously leverage constrained banks as
in (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), which, in addition to private capital assets, hold
government bonds that are subject to default risk. As stressed by (van der Kwaak
and van Wijnbergen, 2014), the exposure of banks in the Eurozone to domestic
sovereign bonds is substantial. Thus, fluctuations in the degree of fiscal stress are
likely to affect the conditions of the banks’ asset side, and therefore their ability to
supply loans to firms. Indeed, as highlighted by (Corsetti et al., 2013), sovereign risk
spreads and private credit spreads have been highly correlated in those countries
in the Eurozone, which experienced increasing degrees of fiscal stress. Introducing
the link between fragile banks and risky government bonds into the model allows
me to capture that variations in government spending, to the extent that they affect
the degree of fiscal stress, can have an immediate impact on the credit supply, and
therefore on investment in the economy. Fiscal stress is captured in the model by
the probability of a sovereign default modeled in the form of a fiscal limit function
as discussed by (Leeper and Walker, 2011) and used in similar variations by other
authors.2 This function maps the debt-to GDP ratio into the probability of a sovereign
default. In this setting, I analyze government spending multipliers obtained by a
first-order approximation, as well as a third-order approximation to equilibrium
dynamics. using the non-linear moving average approach by (Lan and Meyer-Gohde,
2013). Employing a third-order approximation implies that the degree of aggregate
risk affects the equilibrium dynamics, and hence the response of the economy to a
government spending shock. As a consequence, the precautionary motive of agents is
accounted for.
I find that the degree of fiscal stress does affect the government spending multiplier in
my model. An increase in government spending increases both, aggregate output
and public debt. Initially, the debt-to-GDP ratio, and therefore also the sovereign
default probability, decrease due to the output stimulus triggered by the increase in
government spending. After a few quarters, however, as the stimulus fades out and
public debt remains high, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the sovereign default probability
increase above pre-shock level. The increase in the default probability raises the
interest rate on government bonds, and as prices of capital assets and bonds are
determined jointly in equilibrium, they also raise the interest rate on loans that the
bank extend to firms. Thus, the increase in fiscal stress contributes to a crowding out
of investment, dampens the output stimulus, and lowers the government spending
2Examples include: (Bi and Traum, 2012a), (Bi and Traum, 2012b), (Corsetti et al., 2013), (van der
Kwaak and van Wijnbergen, 2013), (van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen, 2015), (Bi et al., 2014).
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multiplier.
However, whether this effect is quantitatively important depends on the way
the model is solved. In the linearized economy, the effect of this ’fiscal stress channel’
on bond prices and on the output response to the shock is negligible. In contrast,
when the model is solved with a third-order approximation, and therefore the role
of aggregate risk for the transmission of the shock is accounted for, the ’fiscal stress
channel’ can become sizable.
The financial accelerator embedded in the model, and the probability of a
sovereign default, are key to generating a relevant effect of risk on the equilibrium
dynamics. A positive government spending shock worsens the balance sheet position
of risk averse banks. When the risk of future shocks, that have the potential to further
weaken the balance sheet of banks, is accounted for, the banks reduce their exposure
to the risky asset to a larger degree. The fall in credit supply and investment is stronger,
and the output stimulus is smaller and more short-lived than in a linear world,
where the degree of risk has no impact on the dynamics of the model. The smaller
output stimulus leads to a more immediate and more pronounced increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio, and hence also the sovereign default probability. This in turn
further aggravates the balance sheet position of banks, reducing the credit supply, and
further decreasing the government spending multiplier. The fiscal stress channel is
more important for the government spending multiplier, the higher the debt-to-GDP
ratio, the higher the sensitivity of fiscal stress to the debt-to-GDP ratio, and the higher
the leverage ratio of banks. When the debt-to-GDP ratio is calibrated to 1.3, roughly
matching the debt-to-GDP ratio observed in Italy in the recent years, the cumulative
multiplier even becomes negative. Hence, solving the model non-linearly opens the
door for a quantitatively relevant role of fiscal stress, and helps to explain why in
the presence of higher fiscal stress, the government spending multiplier can be smaller.
A number of empirical papers find that the government spending multiplier
is smaller, when public finances are weak. Analyzing data from a panel of 19 OECD
countries from 1965 to 1994, (Perotti, 1999) finds evidence of substantially smaller
government spending multipliers for countries that are characterized by high public
debt levels or deficits. This finding of smaller multipliers in the presence of higher
debt is corrobated by (Corsetti et al., 2012), (Guajardo et al., 2014), and (Ilzetzki et al.,
2013). The latter find surprisingly large, negative long run multipliers for countries
with high public debt. (Klein, 2016) finds that high public debt levels reduce the
government spending multiplier, regardless of whether the stock of private debt in
the economy is high or low. Recently, (Born et al., 2015) and (Strobel, 2016) employ
regime-switching SVARs to analyze the effects of government spending shocks, when
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risk premiums on government bonds are high. (Born et al., 2015) analyze a panel of 38
developing and developed countries and find that in periods of higher risk premiums
on government bonds, the government spending multiplier is higher than in periods
with lower risk premiums. However, they acknowledge the challenge of disentangling
the effects of higher sovereign spreads and the effects of recessions on the multiplier
in their sample.3 To circumvent this difficulty, (Strobel, 2016) focusses on the case of
Italy, between 1993 and 2013, as in this sample the correlation between fiscal stress,
measured by the risk spreads on Italian government bonds, and output growth is low.
Here, cumulative government spending multipliers for a time horizon of three years
are significantly lower in a regime with higher sovereign yield spreads . Thus overall,
the literature tends to find smaller multipliers in the face of fragile public finances.
This paper is not alone in analyzing the relation between fiscal stress and the
government spending multiplier. The paper closest to mine is (van der Kwaak and van
Wijnbergen, 2015). As I do in this paper, they employ the model framework by (Gertler
and Karadi, 2011) augmented by risky long-term government bonds to investigate
the link between the government spending multiplier and sovereign default risk.
They find that due to the leverage constraint on banks, deficit financed government
spending crowds out loans to private firms, which decreases the government spending
multiplier. Furthermore, a longer duration of government bonds and the presence
of default risk decreases the effectiveness of government spending. While my paper
confirms their main findings, it differs from theirs along two dimensions: First, while
in their model fiscal stress is determined by the level of public debt, in mine the fiscal
stress indicator is a function of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This changes the dynamic
response of the fiscal stress indicator the government spending shocks, as the output
stimulus after the shock initially decreases the debt-to-GDP ratio. As a consequence,
in my linearized model, the link between fiscal stress and the government spending
multiplier is drastically weaker than it is in (van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen, 2015).
Secondly, I additionally demonstrate the effect of risk on the size of the multiplier,
which in my framework allows me to generate the negative relation between the
degree of fiscal stress and the multiplier found in the empirical literature.
Another recent theoretical paper on government spending and the presence of fiscal
stress is (Corsetti et al., 2013). They argue that in the presence of fiscal stress , fiscal
retrenchment, insofar as it stabilizes public finances, may also enhance the stability of
the macroeconomy. In the extreme case this may even imply a negative government
spending multiplier. The possibility of a expansionary fiscal contraction was originally
proposed by (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). (Bertola and Drazen, 1993) build a model
in which a fiscal retrenchment improves the expectations of households on the
3In contrast to fiscal stress , recessions are associated with higher government spending multipliers.
(See, e.g. (Christiano et al., 2011), (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012))
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future growth path and increases consumption. (Alesina and Perotti, 1997) suggest
that lower risk premiums provide a channel through which fiscal contraction may
stimulate investment and economic growth. 4
A number of panel data studies investigate the drivers of sovereign yield spreads.
Examples include (Alesina et al., 1992), (Bernoth et al., 2003), (Manganelli and
Wolswijk, 2009), (di Cesare et al., 2012), (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) and others.
Generally, these studies find that higher public debt and lower growth raise risk
premiums in the same period. (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) suggest that there was
a contagion effect spilling over from Greece. Among others, they argue that there
has been a ”fundamental contagion” which caused the markets to become more
aware of the economic fundamentals in periphery countries. As only the periphery
countries with high public debt and low GDP growth were affected by these spells, the
results of this literature points towards an increase of the sensitivity of default risk to
economic fundamentals in crisis time. In my framework, I model the relationship
between fundamentals and the probability of a sovereign default in the form of a fiscal
limit function a la (Leeper and Walker, 2011). I use a logistic distribution function,
which increases with the debt-to-GDP ratio, and calibrate it using parameter values
from the structural estimation on Italian data by (Bi and Traum, 2012a). The shape of
this function allows for capturing the empirically observed non-linear relationship
between fundamentals and sovereign yield spreads.
The role of aggregate risk for equilibrium dynamics in DSGE models is inves-
tigated by a strand of the literature, which was started by (Bloom, 2009).5 The focus of
this literature lies on the effects of stochastic exogenous volatility. Capturing the effects
of volatility shocks requires a third-order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics.
As the focus of the paper at hand is the analysis of a government spending shock, I
abstract from volatility shocks (often called ”risk shocks” or ”uncertainty shocks”) and
hold the degree of risk constant. Typically, an impulse response function to a level
shock is an object for which a first-order approximation is regarded to be sufficient
for its analysis. In my framework however, the financial accelerator mechanism
together with the presence of fiscal stress generate sufficient amplification, so
that the impact of aggregate risk for the transmission of the government spending
shock is strong enough to create a non-negligible difference between multipliers
generated with a first-order approximation and a third-order approximation. In
4Other examples of papers that discuss explain the possibility of expansionary fiscal contraction are:
(Blanchard, 1990) and (Sutherland, 1997). For emipirical evidence in support of the this hypothesis, see,
e.g., (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990), (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010) and (Bergman and Hutchison, 2010).
Studies who cast doubt on the empirical evidence for the expansionary contraction hypothesis are
(Perotti, 2011) and (Guajardo et al., 2014).
5see also, e.g., (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011), (Basu and Bundick, 2015) (Bachmann and Bayer,
2013)
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turn, taking into account risk and the precautionary behavior of agents, allows
me to generate the negative relationship between the degree of fiscal stress, and
the size of the government spending multiplier, that is found in the empirical literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two gives an overview
of the model. Section three discusses the calibration and the solution method. The
fourth section provides an anatomy of the dynamic consequences of government
spending shocks, and an analysis of the dynamic effects of government spending
shocks for the model with fiscal stress. It compares linear impulse response functions
with their non-linear counterpart, and compares the dynamics of a model with fiscal
stress to a model in which the effects of fiscal stress for the multiplier are shut off.
Section five highlights conditions under which the fiscal stress channel is particularly
important for the government spending multiplier, and section six concludes.
3.2 The model
The environment
The model builds on the framework used by (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), and adds an
extra twist to make it suitable for the analysis of the link between fiscal stress and the
government spending multiplier. In particular, in addition to capital assets, banks
hold government bonds as a second asset on their balance sheets, and the default
probability of government bonds is tied to the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Time is discrete, and one period in the model represents one quarter. The model
features households, banks, intermediate good producers, capital good producers,
retailers, a fiscal and a monetary authority. Figure (3.1) provides an illustration of the
model structure. Households consume, supply labor, and save in the form of bank
deposits. The firm sector consists of three types of firms. Intermediate good producers
employ labor and capital to produce their goods. Each period, after producing their
output, they sell their used capital stock to the capital goods producers. The latter
repair it, and invest in new capital. At the end of the period they re-sell the capital
to the intermediate good producers, which use it for production in the next period.
The intermediate good producers finance their purchases of capital with loans from
the banks. Intermediate goods are purchased by retailers, which repackage them,
and sell them with a markup as final goods to households, the capital producers,
and to the government. Banks hold loans and government bonds on the asset side
of their balance sheets. On the liability side are deposits and the banks net worth.
The government consumes final goods, collects taxes, and issues government bonds,
which are subject to default risk. Monetary policy takes the form of a Taylor rule.
The model includes habit formation in consumption, convex investment adjustment
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the model
costs, sticky prices, and price indexation to enhance the empirical plausibility of the
model dynamics, and to facilitate the comparability of my results with the results by
other authors which have used this framework.
Households
There is a continuum of households with a unit mass. As in (Gertler and Karadi, 2011)
a constant fraction f of each household’s members works as banker, whereas the other
fraction (1− f ) consists of workers who supply labor to the intermediate good pro-
ducers. While workers receive their wage income every period, bankers reinvest their
gains in asset holdings of the bank over several periods, and contribute to the house-
holds income only when exiting the banking sector, bringing home the accumulated
profits. To ensure that both fractions of the household face the same consumption
stream, perfect consumption insurance within the household is assumed. Households’
expected lifetime utility is as follows
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [ln(Ct −hCt−1)− χ
1+φL
1+φ
t ],
where Ct is consumption and Lt is labor that the workers supply to intermediate good
producers. β is the discount factor, h is the parameter of the habit formation, φ is the
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inverse of the Frisch elasticity, and χ scales the weight of the disutility from labor in
the preferences. Households can save via a one period bank deposit, which earns the
riskless interest rate, Rt . The income stream of the household is thus composed of the
wage income WtLt , banker’s profitsΥbt , firm profits,Υ
f
t net the payment of lump sum
taxes Tt . It uses this income to purchase consumption goods or to renew its deposits.
The budget constraint thus reads
Ct +D t =WtLt +Rt−1D t−1+Υbt +Υ ft −Tt .
Maximizing life-time utility with respect to consumption, labor and deposit holdings
subject to the sequence of budget constraints yields the first order conditions of the
household
Wt =
χLφt
Uc,t
, (3.1)
Uc,t = (Ct −hCt−1)−1−βhEt (Ct+1−hCt )−1, (3.2)
1= EtβΛt ,t+1Rt , (3.3)
with
Λt ,t+1 =
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
. (3.4)
Firm sectors
The model contains three types of firms. Intermediate goods are produced by perfectly
competitive firms, which use capital and labor as inputs for production. Monopolisti-
cally competitive retailers buy a continuum of intermediate goods, and assemble them
into a final good. Nominal frictions as in (Calvo, 1983) make the retailers optimization
problem dynamic. Additionally, a capital producing sector buys up capital from the
intermediate good producer, repairs it, and builds new capital, which it sells to the
intermediate good sector again. Investment in new capital is subject to investment
adjustment costs.
Intermediate good producers
In this setup dynamic pricing and investment decisions are carried out by retailers
and capital good producers, respectively. Thus, the optimization of the intermediate
good producers can be reduced to a sequence of static problems. Their production
function takes a standard Cobb Douglas form, given by
Ymt = At (ξtKt−1)αL1−αt , (3.5)
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where 0 < α < 1 and At is an index for the level of technology. Kt−1 is the capital
purchased and installed in period t −1, which becomes productive in period t , and
ξt is a shock to the quality of capital which can be interpreted as obsolesce of the
employed capital. (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010) and (Gertler and Karadi, 2011) use this
capital quality shock to simulate the banking crisis preceding the Great Recession in
the US. In the context of this analysis it allows me to account for a source of risk for
the price of capital assets.
At the end of each period the intermediate good producer sells the capital
stock that it used for production to the capital producer which repairs the capital,
and purchases the capital stock that it is going to use in the next period from the
capital producer. To finance the purchase of the new capital at the price Qt per unit, it
issues a claim for each unit of capital it acquires to banks, which trade at the same
price. The interest rate the firm has to pay on the loan from the bank is Rk,t . Under
the assumption that the competitive firms make zero profits, the interest rate on
their debt will just equal the realized ex-post return on capital. The resale value of the
capital used in production depends on the realization of the capital quality shock, and
the depreciation rate. Capital evolves according to the following law of motion
Kt = (1−δ)ξtKt−1+ It . (3.6)
Hence each period the firm in its investment decision maximizes
Et [βΛt ,t+1(−Rk,t+1QtKt +Pm,t+1Ym,t+1−Wt+1Lt+1+ (1−δ)Qt+1Ktξt+1)]
with respect to Kt . In optimum the ex-post return then is as follows
Rk,t+1 =
Pm,t+1α
Ym,t+1
Kt
+ (1−δ)Qt+1ξt+1
Qt
. (3.7)
Additionally, the optimal choices of labor input yields the first order conditions
Wt = Pmt (1−α)Ymt
Lt
. (3.8)
Capital good producers
The capital good producer’s role in the model is to isolate the investment decision
that becomes dynamic through the introduction of convex investment adjustment
costs, which is a necessary feature to generate variation in the price of capital. Capital
good producers buy the used capital, restore it and produce new capital goods. Since
capital producers buy and sell at the same price, the profit they make is determined
by the difference between the quantities sold and bought, i.e. investment. Thus they
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choose the optimal amount of investment to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΛ0,t
{
[(Qt −1)It − f
(
It
It−1
)
It
}
.
The first order condition of the capital producer reads
Qt = 1+ f
(
It
It−1
)
+ It
It−1
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
−EtβΛt ,t+1
(
It
It−1
)2
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
, (3.9)
where the functional form of the investment adjustment costs is
f
(
It
It−1
)
= ηi
2
(
It
It−1
−1
)2
.
Retailers
Retailers produce differentiated goods by re-packaging the intermediate goods. They
operate under monopolistic competition and face nominal rigidities à la (Calvo, 1983).
As an additional element to smooth the equilibrium dynamics of inflation, it is as-
sumed that in each period the fraction of firms that cannot choose its optimal price,
γ, indexes its price to the inflation of the foregoing period. The parameter of price
indexation is γp . Aggregate final output, Yt , is described by a CES aggregator of the
individual retailers’ final goods, Y f t
Yt =
(∫1
0
Y
²−1
²
f t d f
) ²
²−1
.
where ²> 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of final goods.
Thus the demand for its final goods that the retailer faces is
Y f t =
(
P f t
Pt
)−²
Yt ,
where P f t is the price chosen by retailer f . The aggregate price index is
Pt =
(∫1
0
P1−²f t di
) 1
1−²
,
which due to the specific assumptions on the nominal rigidity can be written as
Π1−²t = (1−γ)(Π∗t )1−²+γΠ
γp (1−²)
t−1 , (3.10)
whereΠt := PtPt−1 , andΠ∗t :=
P∗t
Pt−1 . As the retailers’ only input is the intermediate good
which is sold by competitive producers, the marginal cost of the retailers equals the
price of the intermediate good. Hence, each retailer chooses its optimal price to
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maximize the sum of its expected discounted profits
Et
∞∑
i=0
(γβ)iΛt ,t+i
{
P∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(Πt+k−1)γp −Pm,t+i
}
Y f ,t+i ,
subject to the demand constraint. The first order condition for optimal price setting
reads
Et
∞∑
i=0
(γβ)iΛt ,t+i
{
P∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(Πt+k−1)γp −
²−1
²
Pm,t+i
}(
P∗t
Pt+i
)−²
Yt+i = 0.
Accordingly, the optimal choice of the price implies
Π∗t =
²
²−1
Ft
Zt
Πt , (3.11)
where Ft and Zt are defined recursively as
Ft = YtPmt +βγΛt ,t+1Π²t+1Π
−γp²
t Ft+1, (3.12)
Zt = Yt +βγΛt ,t+1Π²−1t+1Π
−γp (²−1)
t Zt+1. (3.13)
Equations (13)-(16) constitute the equilibrium conditions, which in a linearized form
are equivalent to a New Keynesian Phillips Curve with price indexation. Aggregate
output of final goods, Yt , is related to the aggregate intermediate output, Ymt , in the
following way
Ymt =∆p,tYt , (3.14)
where ∆t is the dispersion of individual prices, which evolves according to the law of
motion
∆p,t = γ∆p,t−1Π²tΠ
−γp²
t−1 + (1−γ)
1−γΠ²−1t Π−γp (²−1)t−1
1−γ
 ²²−1 . (3.15)
The markup X t of the monopolistic retailers is the inverse of their marginal costs,
which is equivalent to the price of the intermediate good
X t = 1
Pmt
. (3.16)
Banks
Banks finance their operations by creating deposits, D t , which are held by households,
and by their net worth, Nt . They use their funds to extend loans to intermediate good
producers for acquiring capital, Kt , and for the purchases of government bonds, Bt at
34 CHAPTER 3. THEMULTIPLIER, FISCAL STRESS, AND RISK
their market price Qbt . The balance sheet of bank j is given by
QtK j t +Qbt B j t =N j t +D j t . (3.17)
The banks retain the earnings, generated by the return on their assets purchased in
the previous period, and add it to their current net worth. Thus, the law of motion for
the net worth of a bank is given by
N j t =RktQt−1K j ,t−1+RbtQbt−1B j ,t−1−Rt−1D j ,t−1. (3.18)
Note that while the interest rate on deposits raised in period t −1, is determined in
the same period, the return of the risky capital assets and risky government bonds
purchased in period t −1 is determined only after the realization of shocks at the
beginning of period t . Substituting the balance sheet into the law of motion for net
worth yields
N j t = (Rkt −Rt−1)Qt−1K j ,t−1+ (Rbt −Rt−1)Qbt−1B j ,t−1+Rt−1N j ,t−1. (3.19)
Bankers continue accumulating their net worth, until they exit the business. Each
period, each banker faces a lottery, which determines, regardless of the history of the
banker, whether he exits his business or stays in the sector. Bankers exit the business
with an exogenous probability 1−θ, or continue their operations with probability θ.
The draws of this lottery are i.i.d.. When a banker leaves the sector, it adds his terminal
wealth Vt to the wealth of its household. Therefore, bankers seek to maximize the
expected discounted terminal value of their wealth
V j t = max Et
∞∑
i=0
(1−θ)θiβi+1Λt ,t+1+iN j ,t+1+i
= max Et [βΛt ,t+1(1−θ)N j ,t+1+θV j ,t+1].
As banks operate under perfect competition, with perfect capital markets the risk
adjusted return on loans and government bonds would equal the return on deposits.
However, bankers face an endogenous limit on the amount of funds that households
are willing to supply as deposits. Following (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), I assume that
bankers can divert a fraction of their assets and transfer it to their respective house-
holds. However, if they do so, their depositors will choose to withdraw their remaining
funds and force the bank into bankruptcy. To avoid this scenario, households will keep
their deposits at a bank only as long as the bank’s continuation value is higher or equal
to the amount that the bank can divert. Formally, the incentive constraint of the bank
reads
V j t ≥λQtK j t +λbQbt B j t , (3.20)
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where λ, is the fraction of loans that the bank can divert, and λb is the fraction of
government bonds it can divert. I calibrate λb to be smaller than λ. This is motivated
by the fact, that, in general, the collateral value of government bonds is higher than
that of loans.6 The reason is that loans to private firms are less standardized than
government bonds contracts. Additionally, information on the credit-worthiness of
the government is publicly available, while the credit-worthiness of private firms is
often only known to the bank and the firm, and not easy to assess for depositors,
making it easier for banks to divert a fraction of their value.
The initial guess for the form of the value function is
V j t = νk j tQtK j t +νb j tQbt B j t +νn j tN j t , (3.21)
where νk j t ,νb j t and νd j t are time varying coefficients. Maximizing (23) with respect
to loans and bonds, subject to (22) yields the following first order conditions for loans,
bonds, and µt , the Lagrangian multiplier on the incentive constraint
νk j t =λ
µ j t
1+µ j t
, (3.22)
νb j t =λb
µ j t
1+µ j t
, (3.23)
νk j tQtK j t +νb j tQbt B j t +νn j tN j t =λQtK j t +λbQbt B j t . (3.24)
Given that the incentive constraint binds7, a bank’s supply of loans can be written as
QtK j t =
νb j t −λb
λ−νk j t
Qbt B j t +
νn j t
λ−νk j t
N j t . (3.25)
As (27) shows, the supply of loans decreases with an increase in λ, which regulates
the tightness of the incentive constraint with respect to capital, and increases with
an increase in λb , which makes the holding of bonds more costly in terms of a tighter
constraint. Plugging the demand for loans into (23), and combining the result with
(24) and (25) one can write the terminal value of the banker as a function of its net
worth8
V j t = (1+µ j t )νn j tNt . (3.26)
A higher continuation value, V j t is associated with a higher shadow value of holding
an additional marginal unit of assets, or put differently, with a higher shadow value of
6This is in the vein of Meeks et al. (2014), who use the same approach to distinguish between the
collateral values of loans and asset backed securities.
7The constraint binds in the neighborhood of the steady state. For convenience, I make the assump-
tion that it is binding throughout all experiments.
8Detailed derivations are delegated to the appendix.
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marginally relaxing the incentive constraint. Defining the stochastic discount factor of
the bank to be
Ω j ,t ≡Λt−1,t ((1−θ)+θ(1+µ j t )νn j t ), (3.27)
plugging (28) into the Bellman equation, and using the law of motion for net worth,
one can then write the value function as
V j t = Et [βΛt ,t+1(1−θ)N j ,t+1+θV j ,t+1]
= Et [βΩ j ,t+1((Rk,t+1−Rt )QtK j ,t + (Rb,t+1−Rt )Qbt B j ,t +RtN j ,t−1)],
and verify the initial guess for the value function as
νk j t = βEtΩ j t+1(Rk,t+1−Rt ), (3.28)
νb j t = βEtΩ j t+1(Rb,t+1−Rt ), (3.29)
νn j t = βEtΩ j t+1Rt . (3.30)
Aggregation of financial variables
To facilitate aggregation of financial variables, I assume that banks share the same
structure to the extent that they derive the same respective values from holding
loans and bonds, and from raising deposits (i.e., ∀ j : νk j t = νkt ,νb j t = νbt ,νn j t =
νnt ). Furthermore, I assume that all banks have the same ration of capital assets to
government bonds, ςt ≡ QtKtQbt Bt , in their portfolio. As an implication, the leverage ratio
of banks does not depend on the conditions that are specific to individual institutes,
and all banks share the same weighted leverage ratio9
φt ≡ νnt (1+ςt )
(λ−νkt )(1+ λbλ ςt )
= QtKt +Q
b
t Bt
Nt
.10 (3.31)
Note that the lower divertability of government bonds relative to capital assets, allows
the bank to increase its leverage ratio, compared to a scenario in which banks only
hold capital assets. The aggregate balance sheet constraint reads
QtKt +Qbt Bt =D t +Nt . (3.32)
The net worth of the fraction of bankers that survive period t −1 and continue operat-
ing in the banking sector, θ, can be written as
Not = θ
[
RktQt−1Kt−1+RbtQbt−1Bt−1−Rt−1D t−1
]
. (3.33)
9Details are delegated to the appendix.
10Note that if the collateral values of capital assets and bonds were the same (λ=λb), the leverage
ratio would take the same form as in (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), or in (Kirchner and van Wijnbergen,
2016)
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A fraction (1−θ) of bankers leaves the business. There is a continuum of bankers, and
the draws out of the lottery, which determines whether a banker stays in business or
exits the sector, are iid. Hence, by the law of large numbers, it follows that the share of
assets that leaves the sector is a fraction (1−θ) of the total assets. At the same time,
new bankers enter the sector. New bankers are endowed with ”start-up funding” by
their households. The initial endowment of the new bankers is proportionate to the
assets that leave the sector. The net worth of the new bankers, Nnt , can be written as
Nnt =ω
[
Qt−1Kt−1+Qbt−1Bt−1
]
, (3.34)
where ω is calibrated to ensure that the size of the banking sector is independent of
the turnover of bankers. Aggregate net worth, Nt , is then the sum of the net worth of
old and new bankers
Nt =Not +Nnt . (3.35)
Fiscal policy
The fiscal sector closely follows the structure in (van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen,
2013) and (van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen, 2015). The government finances its
expenditures, Gt , by issuing government bonds, which are bought by banks, and by
raising lump sum taxes, Tt . Government spending is exogenous and follows an AR(1)
process
Gt =Geg t , (3.36)
and g t = ρg g t−1+²gt , (3.37)
where G is the steady state government consumption, ρg is the autocorrelation of
government consumption, and ²gt is a shock to government spending. Taxes follow a
simple feedback rule, such that they are sensitive to the level of debt and to changes
in government expenditures
Tt = T +κb(Bt−1−B)+κg (Gt −G), (3.38)
where T and B are the steady state levels of tax revenue and government debt,
respectively. κb is set to ensure that the real value of debt grows a rate smaller than the
gross real rate on government debt. As shown by (Bohn, 1998), this rule is a sufficient
condition to guarantee the solvency of the government. If κg is set to zero, increases
in government expenditures are entirely debt-financed. In turn, when κg = 1, changes
in government spending are tracked one-to-one by changes in taxes.
To allow for the calibration of a realistic average maturity of government debt,
bonds are modeled as consols with geometrically decaying coupon payments, as in
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(Woodford, 1998) and (Woodford, 2001). A bond issued in period t at the price of Qbt ,
pays out a coupon of rc in period t +1, a coupon of ρcrc in period t +2, a coupon
of ρ2crc in t + 2, and so on. Setting the decay factor ρc equal to zero captures the
case of a one-period bond in which the entire payoff of the bond is due in period
t +1. Setting ρc = 1 delivers the case of a perpetual bond. The average maturity of a
bond of this type is 1/(1−βρc). For investors, this payoff structure is equivalent to
receiving the coupon rc and a fraction, ρc , of a similarly structured bond in period
t +1. The beginning-of-period debt of the government can thus be summarized as
(rc +ρcQbt )Bt−1.
At the beginning of each period, the government has the option to default
and write of a fraction of its debt, D ∈ (0,1). Investors take this into account, and
demand a higher return on government bonds, when the expected probability of
a sovereign default, ∆dt+1, increases. The return to government bonds, adjusted for
default risk, can thus be written as
Rb,t = (1−∆dt ∗D)
[
rc +ρcQbt
Qbt−1
]
. (3.39)
The flow budget constraint of the government reads
Gt +RbtQbt−1Bt−1 =Qbt Bt +Tt , (3.40)
or: Gt + (1−∆dt ∗D)
[
rc+ρcQbt
Qbt−1
]
Qbt−1Bt−1 =Qbt Bt +Tt .
Linking the probability of a sovereign default to the level of public debt or the debt-to-
GDP ratio is common in the literature (see, e.g., (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), (Arellano,
2008) or (Leeper and Walker, 2011)). A higher level of public debt implies a higher debt
service, and, in turn, requires higher tax revenues to service the interest rate payments.
As tax increases are not popular and only up to a maximum level politically feasible,
it is plausible to posit a maximum capacity of levying taxes, or fiscal limit. With an
increasing public debt, the economy moves closer to the fiscal limit.
The probability of a sovereign default is described by the logistical distribution func-
tion
∆dt =
exp
(
η1+η2 Bt4Yt )
)
1+exp
(
η1+η2 Bt4Yt
) , (3.41)
which depends on the debt-to-GDP ratio, and is depicted in figure (3.2). The fiscal
limit function is pinned down by the parameters η1 and η2. I use the results of the
structural estimation of an RBC model on Italian data by (Bi and Traum, 2012a) to
calibrate these parameters.
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Figure 3.2: Default indicator, ∆dt
Monetary policy and good market clearing
The policy tool of the central bank in this economy is the nominal interest rate, it ,
which is set to the Taylor-type rule
it = ρi it−1+ (1−ρ)(i +κpipit +κymˆc t )+²it , (3.42)
where the smoothing parameter ρi lies between zero and one, ²it is a monetary policy
shock, and κpi > 1 to satisfy the Taylor principle and guarantee the determinacy of the
rational expectation equilibrium. The real interest rate on deposits and the nominal
policy rate of the central banked are linked via the Fisher equation
1+ it =Rt EtPt+1
Pt
. (3.43)
Finally, the good market clears
Yt =Ct + It + f
(
It
It−1
)
It +Gt . (3.44)
The equilibrium conditions of the full model are collected in the appendix.
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3.3 Calibration and solution method
Calibration
The calibration of the model is motivated by the case of the Italian economy, which
represents a case of a large, relatively closed economy with high public debt, and
recurring periods of high interest rate spreads in the last decades. The model is cali-
brated to quarterly frequency. Table 1 lists the parameter values used in the model. A
major source for the parameter values is (Bi and Traum, 2012a). (Bi and Traum, 2012a)
estimate an RBC model with a sovereign default indicator on Italian data from 1999.Q1
and 2010.Q3. As values for the discount factor, β, and the coefficient of relative risk
aversion they choose 0.99 and 1.00, respectively. In addition, they choose for the deter-
ministic steady state a debt-to-GDP ratio of 1.19, and an output share of government
spending of 0.1966 to match the respective means in their sample. In accordance with
their estimation results, I set the parameter for consumption habit, h, to 0.14, the
persistence and standard deviation of the technology shock, ρa and σa to 0.96 and
0.01, and the persistence and standard deviation of the government spending shock,
ρg and σg to 0.84 and 0.01, respectively. Furthermore they obtain the values 0.3 for κb
and 0.53 for κg . Under the assumption of a haircut of 37.8 percent on the outstanding
debt in case of a sovereign default, their estimation results imply a default function
with the parameter values η1 =−21.5285 and η2 = 3.4015.11
The values of the parameters of the default function reflect that the estimation by
(Bi and Traum, 2012a) is based on a sample that largely contains years in which the
market for Italian government bond was calm. They imply a quarterly default rate of
0.0048 on sovereign bonds, and a low sensitivity of the default rate to movements in
the debt-to-GDP ratio at the deterministic steady state. Similarly, the calibration of
the parameters associated with the government spending shock and the technology
shock reflects a mixture of calm years and crisis years. I choose these parameter values
by (Bi and Traum, 2012a) as my benchmark calibration, since an empirically plausible
calibration of the default function is crucial for the assessment of the role of fiscal
stress for the multiplier. Also, an empirically plausible calibration of the shock pro-
cesses is important for the assessment of the role of aggregate risk for the dynamics of
the model at a third-order approximation. In section 4.3., however, I deviate from the
benchmark calibration, and analyze, among others, how the results are affected, when
the calibration is adjusted such as to match features of the recent debt crisis in the
Italy in which the debt-to-GDP ratio rose to levels of 1.3 and arguably the sensitivity of
fiscal stress to changes in the debt-to-GDP ration, and the degree of aggregate risk in
the economy may have been higher.12
11For more details on the estimation procedure, see (Bi and Traum, 2012a).
12The literature on stochastic volatility argues that the volatility of real and financial variables in-
creases during crisis times (see, e.g., (Bloom, 2009), (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011), (Basu and
Bundick, 2015)).
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In the calibration of the parameters associated with the different firm sectors, I bor-
row from the model by (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), which is the fundament of the
framework at hand.13 The effective capital share, α is 0.33. The depreciation rate is
0.025 in the deterministic steady state. Parameter ηi , which governs the investment
adjustment costs is set to 1.72 and the elasticity of intra-temporal substitution, η, is set
to 4.167. The Calvo parameter, γ= 0.779 implies an average price duration of roughly
four and a half quarters. The degree of price indexation, γp is rather low at 0.241.
Further parameter values that I use from (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), are the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity, ϕ, the feedback parameters in the Taylor rule, κpi and κy , the
persistence of the capital quality shock ρξ, and some parameters of the banking sector.
In the calibration of the banking sector, I follow a similar strategy as (Gertler and
Karadi, 2011), and choose the fractions of the assets that the banks can diverge, λ and
λb , the survival probability of the bankers, θ, and the transfer to new bankers, ω, in
order to target a steady state leverage ratio of 4, an average time horizon of the bankers
of a decade, and the steady state spreads of the returns on the banks assets over the
deposit rate. For the steady state spread of the return on capital over deposits I use the
same target as in (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). For the steady state spread of government
bonds over deposits I take the estimate by (Bocola, 2016) as a guideline.
The difference of the steady state spreads of the two assets is reflected by the values
of the respective divertability parameters, λ and λb . In the deterministic steady state
these two parameters are linked by the relation
λ
λb
= Rk −R
Rb −R
.
The coupon rate on the long-term government bond, rc , is set to 0.04, and the rate of
decay of the bonds, ρc , is set to 0.96 as in (van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen, 2015).
The standard deviations of the monetary policy shock and the capital quality shock
are set to 0.01. The parameter χ, which weighs the disutility of labor is chosen such as
to balance the labor supply equation in the deterministic steady state.
Solution method
The model is solved using a third-order approximation to equilibrium dynamics. I
employ the algorithm developed by (Lan and Meyer-Gohde, 2013).14 Their solution
method solves for the policy functions in the form of a nonlinear moving average. Let
13In turn, (Gertler and Karadi, 2011) borrow most of their parameter values from (Primiceri et al.,
2006), who estimate a medium scale model on US data.
14(Lan and Meyer-Gohde, 2013) show that for the nonlinear moving average method it holds that,
if the first-order solution is stationary and saddle-stable, these properties carry over to higher-order
approximation.
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Table 3.1: Calibration of Parameters
β discount factor 0.99 Bi and Traum (2012)
h habit formation 0.14 Bi and Traum (2012)
χ weight for disutility of labor 4.7125
ϕ inverse of Frisch elasticity 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
α effective capital share 0.33 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
δ depreciation param. 0.025 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ηi invest. adjust. param. 1.728 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
² elasticity of substitution 4,167 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γ Calvo param. 0.779 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γp price indexation param. 0.241 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Rk−R steady state spread 0.01 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Rb−R steady state spread 0.005 Bocola (2015)
λ divertibility of capital assets 0.4479
λb divertibility of bonds 0.2239
θ survival probability of banker 0.975 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ω transfer to new bankers 0.0018
κpi interest rate rule 1.5 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
κy interest rate rule -0.125 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
G/Y share of gov. spending 0.1966 Bi and Traum (2012)
B/4Y debt-to-GDP ratio. 1.19 Bi and Traum (2012)
κb tax rule param. 0.3 Bi and Traum (2012)
κg tax rule param. 0.53 Bi and Traum (2012)
η1 fiscal limit parameter -21.5285 Bi and Traum (2012)
η2 fiscal limit parameter 3.4015 Bi and Traum (2012)
D haircut 0.378 Bi and Traum (2012)
rc coupon rate 0.04 v.d.Kwaak and v. Wijnbergen
(2014)
ρc rate of decay of consol 0.96 v.d.Kwaak and v. Wijnbergen
(2014)
ρi intrest rate smoothing 0.0 v.d.Kwaak and v. Wijnbergen
(2014)
ρξ persistence of ξ-shock 0.66 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρa persistence of a-shock 0.96 Bi and Traum (2012)
ρg persistence of g-shock 0.84 Bi and Traum (2012)
σi std. of i-shock 0.01
σξ std. of ξ-shock 0.01
σg std. of g-shock 0.01 Bi and Traum (2012)
σa std. of a-shock 0.01 Bi and Traum (2012)
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the nonlinear DSGE model be
Et f (yt+1, yt , yt−1,²t )= 0, (3.45)
where yt and ²t represent the vectors of endogenous variables and the vector of
exogenous shocks, respectively. Then the solution to this model can be written as a
system of policy functions of the form
yt = y(σ,²t ,²t−1,²t−2, ...), (3.46)
where σ scales the degree of aggregate risk of the model.15 Under the assumption of
normally distributed shocks (i.e., with zero skewness), the third-order Taylor approxi-
mation of the policy function takes the form
yt = y + 1
2
yσ2σ
2+
∞∑
i=0
(
yi + 1
2
yσ2i
σ2
)
²t−i + 1
2
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
yi , j (²t−i ⊗²t− j ) (3.47)
+1
6
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
yi , j ,k(²t−i ⊗²t− j ⊗²t−k),
where y denotes the vector of deterministic steady state values of the respective
endogenous variables, and the partial derivatives yi , yi , j , yi , j ,k , yσ2 and yσ2i
are
evaluated at the deterministic steady state. Up to the first order approximation, the
policy function is independent of the degree of risk in the model. However, when the
model is approximated with a third-order approximation, two terms enter the policy
function that adjust it for the risk of future shocks. While yσ2 is constant, yσ2i
varies
over time and interacts the linear impulse responses to realized shocks with the risk of
future shocks.
In the case at hand, this becomes particularly relevant as leverage constrained
banks hold risky government bonds on their balance sheets. To the extent that
government spending shocks affect prices and returns of the banks’ assets, they imply
a time-varying adjustment of the banks’ asset holdings to aggregate risk, which alters
the reaction of output to the shock. As the economy moves closer to the fiscal limit
the default probability becomes more sensitive to the fluctuations in the debt-to-GDP
ratio,16 Therefore, the fiscal stress channel amplifies this time-varying adjustment to
risk which, as I will show, affects the dynamic consequences of government spending
15σ= 0 corresponds to the non-stochastic model, whereas σ= 1 corresponds to the model with the
originally assigned distribution of shocks.
16This corresponds to the empirical finding of a higher sensitivity of default risk premiums to funda-
mentals in fiscal crises as found by (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) label
this as an increase in ”fundamental awareness”.
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shocks to output in a quantitatively relevant way, and thus requires a third-order
approximation of equilibrium dynamics.17
3.4 Dynamic analysis of government spending shocks
This section analyses the effects of a shock to government spending. In order to
illustrate the effects of the fiscal stress channel for the output effects of the shock, I
compare the full two model described in section 2. with a model in which the fiscal
stress channel is shut of. Here, I eliminate equation (4.23) from the model, and set
variableΦt is to a constant (i.e.,Φt =Φ ∀t ).18 In all other aspects the two models are
identical. I label the latter model: model without fiscal stress .
3.4.1 The linearized model
Let me first focus on the analysis of the impulse responses to a government
spending shock in the linearized model. The shock is of the size of 1 percent of
steady state GDP. Figure (3.3) depicts the impulse responses. The blue lines show
the effect of the shock in the benchmark model with fiscal stress , whereas the
black lines show the effect of the shock in a model, which abstracts from the
role of fiscal stress for the transmission of the shock. As figure (3.3) illustrates the
contribution of fiscal stress is negligible in the linearized case. However, before I
turn to the non-linear case, I briefly discuss in this section how the features embed-
ded in the model affect the dynamic consequences of the government spending shock.
As the model contains several features, which affect the transmission of the shock, I
start with a brief description of those effects that are independent of financial frictions
or fiscal stress. The government spending shock increases government debt and
stimulates output. Private activity is crowded out, however. Since households are
Ricardian, and preferences are additive separable in consumption and leisure, the
increase in government spending induces a wealth effect on the labor supply.19 As
in many models, consumption falls and the labor supply increases after the shock,
leading to increasing equilibrium labor hours and a decline in the real wage. With the
higher labor input the marginal product of labor decreases. In the presence of sticky
prices, the average real marginal cost increase and the average markup declines with
the increase in production. As a result of the falling markup, the demand for labor
increases for any given real wage, contributing to the increase in equilibrium labor
17Note, that while in principle, time varying risk-adjustment affects the dynamic consequences of
level shocks in any DSGE model, the risk-adjustment components are in general of negligible size. For
the neoclassical growth model, this is illustrated by (Lan and Meyer-Gohde, 2013).
18The value ofΦt in the deterministic steady state, is the same in both models.
19For a discussion of the wealth effect on the labor supply, see, e.g., (Christiano and Eichenbaum,
1992) or (Baxter and King, 1993).
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hours and output.20 As highlighted by (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008), the increase in
labor hours raises the marginal product of capital. In equilibrium this is accompanied
by an increase in the loan rate. This has the effect that investment becomes less
attractive, leading to a decline in the capital stock as well as in the price of capital. The
firms’ demand for loans from banks contracts.
The resulting decline of investment in response to the increase in government
spending, that is essential for the link between fiscal stress and the multiplier in my
model, is consistent with empirical evidence. For the US, a decline in investment in
response to the shock can be found across different approaches to the identification
of government spending shocks (see, e.g., (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), (Mountford
and Uhlig, 2009), (Ramey, 2011b)). Evidence from cross-country panels provided
by (Corsetti et al., 2012) and by (Ilzetzki et al., 2013) similarly points to a decline in
investment in response to an increase in government spending.
As (Kirchner and van Wijnbergen, 2016) show, the crowding-out of investment is
amplified through a contraction in the supply of loans, if government bonds are held
by leverage constrained as it is the case in this model. Banks reduce the supply of
loans for two reasons: First, as they incur capital losses due to the decline in capital
prices, their net worth shrinks, tightening their leverage constraints. Additionally, the
price of government bonds falls together with the price of capital, due to arbitrage on
financial markets, further tightening the leverage constraint. The fall in the prices of
capital assets and bonds drive up the spread of the return on bonds over the return on
deposits. Lastly, the reduction of the supply of loans increases expected future returns
on loans. Hence, the spread of the return on capital assets (loans from the banks to
the firms), over the return of deposits increases. As a consequence of the falling asset
prices, banks are forced to reduce the size of their balance sheets and sell capital
assets, amplifying the fall in the price of capital, and to reduce the supply of loans.
A second reason reason for the contraction of the loan supply is that banks change
the composition of their asset portfolio. The increase in public debt increases their
holdings of government bonds. Given the constraint on the size of banks’ balance
sheets, the portfolio shift towards government bonds exerts further pressure on
the supply of loans to firms. Overall, the financial accelerator mechanism that is
implied by constrained banks amplifies the crowding out of investment compared to
a situation with unconstrained investors in capital assets, and lowers the government
spending multiplier.
20For an analysis of the role of markup shifts for the transmission of government spending shocks in
the New Keynesian model, see: (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008).
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Figure 3.3: Dynamic consequences of a shock in government spending of 1 percent obtained
from a first-order approximation to equilibrium dynamics. The blue lines depict the impulse
responses of a model without fiscal stress. The black line depicts the impulse responses with
fiscal stress.
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Now let me turn to the effect of fiscal stress on the government spending multiplier.
Most of the literature on the interaction of fiscal multipliers and fiscal stress,
theoretical as well as empirical, focusses on the possibility that higher fiscal stress
decreases the impact of government spending shocks. Theoretical studies that focus
on the effect of fiscal retrenchment suggest that, for instance, an improvement of
the expectations of future growth ((Bertola and Drazen, 1993)), or a decrease in risk
premiums on government bonds, enhanced financial intermediation and increasing
investment (e.g. (Alesina and Perotti, 1997), (Corsetti et al., 2013) or (van der Kwaak
and van Wijnbergen, 2013)) counteract the otherwise detrimental effects of fiscal
retrenchment on output growth. I follow the authors who focus in their argument on
the channel of financial intermediation and changes in risk premiums.
The response to the government spending shock in the linearized model with
fiscal stress depicted as black curves in figure (3.3). As one can see, the contribution
of the fiscal stress channel to the response of the financial and real variables to the
government spending shock is very small. The main difference to the scenario without
fiscal stress is that now the default probability responds to the movements in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. As the initial increase in GDP is larger in percentage terms than
the initial increase in public debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases on impact. This
initial fall in the default probability after a fiscal expansion is in line with empirical
findings by (Born et al., 2015) and (Strobel, 2016) who find that in periods of a higher
of fiscal stress, bond yield spreads increase on impact after contractionary fiscal
shocks. Already after the second quarter, the default probability in the model rises
above the steady state, since the increase in debt is more persistent than the output
response. Through equation (3.41) the variation in the default probability contributes
to the fall in price of bonds and the increase in the return on bonds, and as prices and
returns of assets move together, it contributes to the fall in the price of capital and the
increase in the return on capital as well. The contraction of investment and capital
are slightly stronger, and the response of output slightly weaker than in the model
without fiscal stress.
The size of this effect is, however, very small. Table 2 shows the difference in the
government spending multipliers for the two models. Adding the feature of fiscal
stress decreases the impact multiplier from 0.58 to 0.57, and the cumulative multiplier
over a time horizon of 20 quarters from 0.37 to 0.36. Thus, the linearized model cannot
generate the empirical finding that the presence of fiscal stress lowers the government
spending multiplier.
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Table 3.2: Government Spending Multipliers
Impact Multiplier Cumulative Multiplier*
linear , no fiscal stress 0.581 0.368
linear , with fiscal stress 0.569 0.362
*time horizon of 20 quarters
3.4.2 The role of risk for the fiscal stress channel
This section discusses the role of risk for the transmission of government spending
shocks. Figure (3.4) compares the linear impulse responses to the government spend-
ing shock in the full model with fiscal stress (dashed line) with the impulse responses
to the same shock, obtained by a third-order approximation to equilibrium dynamics
(solid line).
The main difference in the two sets of impulse responses lies with the time-varying
adjustment for the risk of future shocks.21 The risk associated with the realization of
future shocks matters because agents are risk-averse and their behavior now reflects a
precautionary motive. In particular, the behavior of banks matters for the transmission
of the shock. As in the linearized model, the increase in government spending crowds
out investment and results in a decrease in asset prices and fire sales of assets by
banks, who incur losses, and face a shrinking net worth and an increasing leverage
ratio. Now, that banks take into account the risk of further, potentially detrimental,
shocks in the future, they react more sensitive to changes in asset prices and interest
rates, and they reduce their exposure to risky assets to a larger extent in response to
the shock. This amplifies the fall in the prices of bonds and capital assets, and leads to
a stronger contraction of the net worth of bankers. As the implied increase in banks’
leverage is stronger, they further have to increase their fire sales and the contraction
in the supply of loans is more pronounced. Hence, the fall in investment is stronger
than in the linearized model, up to three percent in the non-linear case, compared to
a decline of roughly two percent in the linear case. Both values are well within range
of the empirically observed decline after an identified government spending shock.22
21In the context of the third-order approximation to the policy functions, shown above, the differ-
ence between the two sets of impulse responses is almost entirely driven by the risk correction term∑∞
i=0
(
1
2 yσ2i
σ2
)
²t−i . The effects by the second-order and third-order terms, describing actually realized
fluctuations are negligible. See appendix A.3.
22For instance, (Ramey, 2011b) estimates a fall of non-residential investment of 1% after a shock
to defense spending, and a decline of residential investment of 3.5% in response to a government
spending identified via professional forecast errors.
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic consequences of a shock in government spending of 1 percent in the
model with fiscal stress. The dashed lines depict the impulse responses obtained from a first-
order approximation to equilibrium dynamics. The solid lines depicts the impulse responses
obtained from a third-order approximation to equilibrium dynamics.
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Importantly, risk also increases the role of fiscal stress for the multiplier. The steeper
fall in investment leads to a smaller and more short-lived output stimulus in response
to the increase in government spending. Four quarters after the shock, output even
declines below the initial state, and the economy enters a mild recession. As the
response of public debt is hardly altered, the initial fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio
is attenuated and it quickly rises above the initial state, increasing the quarterly
probability of a sovereign default close to half a percent above its steady state value.
Due to the non-linear shape of the fiscal limit function, the increase in the probability
of default implies a higher sensitivity of interest rates to fluctuations in economic
fundamentals.
While the current increase in the probability of default amplifies current losses, the
outlook of a stronger response of the fiscal stress indicator and the economy to future
shocks, which move the debt-to-GDP ratio increases the motive of the banks to
reduce their exposure to risky assets, contributing to the amplification of fire sales,
the stronger contraction in investment, and the dampening of the output stimulus.
The contribution of the fiscal stress channel to the output response to a gov-
ernment spending shock is illustrated by figure (3.5). The black line represents the
full model with fiscal stress and the blue line represents the case in which the fiscal
stress channel is shut off. The dashed lines represent the linear impulse responses
(black - full model, blue - without fiscal stress ). This figure shows that taking into
account the effects of risk on the transmission of the shock alters the response in
both cases with and without fiscal stress. The difference between the solid blue line
and solid black line shows the impact of the fiscal stress channel on the reaction of
aggregate output. While it is still relatively small, it is substantially larger than in the
linear case in which the two curves of the models with and without fiscal stress are
virtually undistinguishable.
Table 3 shows that this is reflected by the resulting government spending multipliers.
In the non-linear case without the fiscal stress channel, the impact multiplier
is 0.54 and the cumulative multiplier is 0.16. Introducing fiscal stress lowers the
impact multiplier to 0.50 and the cumulative multiplier to 0.06. Thus, whereas the
introduction of the fiscal stress channel reduces the cumulative multiplier in the
linearized economy by only 0.006, in the non-linear case, the differences of the
cumulative multipliers with and without fiscal stress is roughly 15 times larger.
Risk also influences the behavior of the other agents in the economy. For the
risk-averse households it strengthens the motive of consumption smoothing and
labor smoothing. Following the shock, households reduce their consumption by
less, and, due to the smaller wealth effect, increase labor supply by less than in the
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Figure 3.5: Output response to a shock in government spending of 1 percent obtained from
a third-order approximation to equilibrium dynamics. The blue line depicts the impulse
responses in the model without fiscal stress. The black line depicts the impulse responses
obtained in the full model with fiscal stress .
Table 3.3: Government Spending Multipliers
Impact Multiplier Cumulative Multiplier*
linear , no fiscal stress 0.581 0.368
linear , with fiscal stress 0.569 0.362
non-linear , no fiscal stress 0.537 0.155
non-linear , with fiscal stress 0.500 0.064
*time horizon of 20 quarters
linear case. Overall however, the steeper fall in investment outweighs the effect of the
attenuation of the consumption response on output, enhancing the fall in output
as well. A few periods after the shock, when the more pronounced decline in capital
becomes effective over time, the response of aggregate consumption follows the fall in
production and declines below its linear counterpart as well. (Born and Pfeifer, 2014)
give an overview of further channels through which aggregate risk influences the
behavior of households and firms in a model with sticky prices. However, as section 5
shows, in the model at hand the link between fiscal stress and the size of the multiplier
virtually disappears, when bonds are not held by leverage constrained banks, I omit a
detailed discussion of further channels.23
23Results for a version of the model in which government bonds are held by households are available
upon request.
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This exercise illustrates two points. Firstly, the transmission of the government
spending shock in general is altered, when risk about future shocks matters. This is
mainly driven by the presence of financial frictions and fiscal stress. Secondly, the
impact of the fiscal stress on the government spending is increased substantially by
taking account of risk and precautionary motives of the agents, helping to generate a
negative effect of fiscal stress on the government multiplier.
However, while the fiscal stress channel is larger than in the linear case, its ef-
fect is still too small to reflect the large effects that fiscal stress can have on the
multiplier according to the empirical findings by (Perotti, 1999) or (Ilzetzki et al., 2013).
Given the benchmark calibration of the model, the latter result is not surprising. Since
the benchmark calibration of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the parameters of the default
function, which are taken from (Bi and Traum, 2012a), reflect a period in which Italian
sovereign bond markets have been rather calm, the default function is relatively flat at
the steady state, implying a low sensitivity of the default probability to changes in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. Section 4.3 discusses under which conditions the link between
fiscal stress and the government spending multiplier is strong.
3.5 When is the impact of fiscal stress on the multiplier
strong?
The moderate role of the fiscal stress channel for the government spending multiplier
in section 4 reflects that the parameter values for the benchmark calibration are ob-
tained from a sample of Italian data from 1999.Q1-2010.Q3, a sample period in which
for most observations, sovereign yield spreads in Italy were low. This section assesses
the role of the fiscal stress channel for the multiplier under conditions that capture
some features of a sovereign debt crisis. In each subsection, I adjust the benchmark
calibration along one dimension. In particular, I focus on the debt-to-GDP ratio, η2,
which governs the sensitivity of the fiscal stress indicator to the debt-to-GDP ratio,
the leverage ratio of banks, the degree of aggregate risk, and κg , which determines, to
what degree increases in government spending are mirrored by increases in taxes. The
figures in this section depict cumulative multipliers for the linear and the non-linear
approximation (dashed and solid lines, respectively), both for the full model and the
model without the fiscal stress channel (blue and black lines, respectively).
The main result for the multipliers obtained by a first-order approximation is that
even for extreme calibrations the role of fiscal stress for the government spending
multiplier is very small. This highlights the necessity for accounting for risk, when the
aim is to generate a link between fiscal stress and the government spending multiplier.
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The results for the multipliers obtained by the non-linear approximation are discussed
in their respective sections.
The role of fiscal stress when public debt is high
The benchmark calibration of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the deterministic steady state
is 1.19, which is the average Italian debt-to-GDP in the sample by (Bi and Traum,
2012a). In recent years, Italy has experienced debt-to-GDP ratios of roughly 1.3. For
the full model it holds that the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio, the smaller the cumu-
lative multiplier, and the stronger is the fiscal stress channel. The solid black line in
the upper panel or figure (3.6)) shows that this relationship is monotonous. This exer-
cise points to the possibility that government spending multipliers have even been
negative in Italy during recent crisis. As mentioned above, the possibility of negative
fiscal multipliers has been discussed controversially following the proposition of the
expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis by (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990).24 In the
context of the model at hand, negative government spending multipliers are possible,
if public finances are sufficiently fragile, and financial intermediation is sufficiently
impaired.
Changing the calibration of the debt-to-GDP ratio affects two mechanisms of the
model, the portfolio shift of banks towards government bonds that is induced by an
increase in government spending, and the effect of variations in the bond price in
the necessity for banks to reduce the size of their balance sheets. Increases in the
calibration of the debt-to-GDP increase the amount of public debt that banks hold
in their portfolio and the strength of the crowding out of loans on the balance sheets
through portfolio shifts. Thus for both models, with and without financial stress, the
multiplier decreases for lower debt-to-GDP ratios.
In the model in which the effect of fiscal stress on bond prices is eliminated (or
very weak, as in the case of the linear approximation of the full model), the price of
capital assets falls by more than the price of bonds after an expansionary government
spending shock. This reflects that in the model without fiscal stress, the reason for
the fall in bond prices is the fall in the price of capital assets, which is induced by
the crowding out of investment. As the price of capital falls by more than the price of
bonds, the fall in the average price of assets held by the banks is smaller, and therefore
the need to delever is less severe, the larger the amounts of government bonds on the
balance sheet relative to capital assets. Hence, a higher the debt-to-GDP ratio implies
a less severe contraction in the banks’ balance sheets after the shock. For debt-to-GDP
ratios higher than 1.25, the latter effect dominates in the model without financial
stress, and the multiplier increases with further increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
In the full model in which government bond prices are affected by fiscal stress, they
fall by more, the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio. Hence, the price effect decreases the
24see, e.g., (Bertola and Drazen, 1993), (Alesina and Perotti, 1997), (Guajardo et al., 2014).
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative government spending multipliers for a time-horizon of 20 periods.
The x-axis shows the calibration of the parameters in the deterministic steady state. Blue
dashed line - model without fiscal stress, linear approximation; Black dashed line - model
with fiscal stress, linear approximation; Blue solid line - model without fiscal stress, non-linear
approximation; Black solid line - model with fiscal stress, non-linear approximation.
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multiplier for high public debt. The multipliers of the model without fiscal stress
and the full model diverge for large debt-to-GDP ratios. This illustrates that for large
debt-to-GDP ratios, the effect of fiscal stress on the size of the government spending
multiplier increases, allowing for a size of this effect that is closer to the what empirical
evidence by (Perotti, 1999) and (Ilzetzki et al., 2013) suggest.
The role of fiscal stress when it is very sensitive to the debt-to-GDP ratio
(Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) suggest that during the recent debt crisis in the Eurozone
the sensitivity of default risk premiums on government bonds to fundamentals became
stronger for countries with weak public finances. The exercise in this section highlights
that, if this sensitivity is increased in the model, fiscal stress can drastically lower
cumulative multipliers, and, as in the previous subsection, even lead to negative
multipliers. The more sensitive the fiscal stress indicator to variations in the debt-to-
GDP ratio, the stronger is the fiscal stress channel, and the smaller is the cumulative
multiplier. The lower panel of figure (3.6) shows the sensitivity of the cumulative
multiplier to η2, which governs the sensitivity of fiscal stress to the debt-to-GDP ratio.
The benchmark calibration of this parameter value is 3.4015. The changes in the
calibration of the debt-to-GDP ratio already entailed changes in the sensitivity of
the fiscal stress indicator, as the latter is a convex function of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
However, the sensitivity analysis with respect to η2 isolates the price effects discussed
in the previous section from the effects of variations in the steady state quantity of
government bonds. As the model without fiscal stress does not feature a fiscal stress
indicator, only the results for the full model are plotted. The higher η2 the stronger
are the degree of fiscal stress, bond prices, and the financial accelerator affected
by variations in government spending. Thus, the contraction of the loan supply is
stronger for higher values of η2, and the weaker is the output response induced by
government spending shocks and the smaller the cumulative multiplier.
The role of fiscal stress when the degree of risk is high
The literature on stochastic volatility suggests macroeconomic and financial variables
are higher, when the economy experiences a crisis.25 In this subsection, I analyze
how the degree of aggregate risk affect the government spending multiplier, and in
particular, the role of the fiscal stress channel for the multiplier. Increasing the degree
of risk does not affect the importance of the fiscal stress channel for the cumulative
government spending multiplier. The upper panel of figure (3.7) depicts the relation
between the degree of risk, scaled by factor k, and the multiplier in the model without
25See, e.g.,(Bloom, 2009), (Basu and Bundick, 2015). (Bloom, 2009) calibrates the standard deviation
of second moment shocks to TFP to a hundred percent of the standard deviation of the respective
first moment shocks. (Basu and Bundick, 2015) calibrate the volatility of second moment shocks to a
preference shock to be one sixths of the volatility of the respective level shock.
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and with fiscal stress. The benchmark calibration of k is 1. Concretely, in this exercise
the standard deviations of all shocks except the government spending shock are
premultiplied with k. Higher level of risk affect the multiplier mostly through a stronger
effect of precautionary fire sales by banks, and a stronger financial accelerator. While
figure (3.7) shows that for higher degrees of risk, the government multiplier decreases,
the contribution of the fiscal stress channel to the size of the multiplier stays fairly
stable.
The role of fiscal stress when banks’ leverage is high
Another feature of the recent debt crisis in the Eurozone were weakly capitalized banks.
When banks are highly levered, fiscal stress has a stronger impact on the government
spending multiplier. The middle panel of figure (3.7) depicts the relation between
the leverage ratio in the deterministic steady state and the multiplier in the model
without and with fiscal stress. The higher banks are levered up, the stronger is the need
to delever in the face of adverse shocks to asset prices. As the fiscal stress channel
amplifies the fall in the price of government bonds after an increase in government
spending, it also amplifies the pressure on banks to delever after the shock. This
stronger pressure on banks balance sheets becomes more notable, the higher the
leverage ratio. Thus, the difference between the multipliers in the model with and
without the fiscal stress channel increases for higher leverage ratios. Hence, the impor-
tance of fiscal stress for the government spending multiplier is likely to be higher, in
crises such as the recent crisis in the Eurozone in which banks were weakly capitalized,
and is likely to decrease when banks’ capital buffers are strengthened.
The role of fiscal stress when the share of debt-financing is high
Lastly, the government spending multiplier is lower for smaller shares of tax-financing
of variations in government expenditures. The lower panel of figure (3.7) depicts the
relation between the response coefficient for lump sum taxes to variations in gov-
ernment spending, κg , and the cumulative multiplier in the model without and with
fiscal stress. For a value of 1, variations in government spendings are fully mimicked
by changes in taxes. For low values, the share of debt-financing is higher. The higher
the share of debt-financing, the more the amount of government bonds held by banks
increases, and the stronger the crowding out effect of investment. Thus, the multiplier
decreases in the share of debt-financing for both models. However, due to the low
sensitivity of the bond price to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio implied by the bench-
mark calibration, the difference between the multipliers in both models, and hence
the importance of the fiscal stress channel for the government spending multiplier, is
only weakly altered by variations in the share of debt-financing.
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Figure 3.7: Cumulative government spending multipliers for a time-horizon of 20 periods.
The x-axis shows the calibration of the parameters in the deterministic steady state. Blue
dashed line - model without fiscal stress, linear approximation; Black dashed line - model
with fiscal stress, linear approximation; Blue solid line - model without fiscal stress, non-linear
approximation; Black solid line - model with fiscal stress, non-linear approximation
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3.6 Conclusion
According to a growing empirical literature, the government spending multiplier is
smaller for countries that experience fiscal stress, as opposed to countries, which
have sound public finances. This paper develops a theoretical model with leverage
constrained banks and sovereign default risk to explain the link between fiscal stress
and the size of the government spending multiplier suggested by the empirical
literature. To the extent that a positive shock to government spending crowds
out investment, it lowers the price of capital assets, which induces a downward
pressure on the price of bonds as well. Additionally, the government spending shock
increases the downward pressure on bond prices to the extent that it increases
the debt-to-GDP ratio and raises the degree of fiscal stress. The fall of asset prices
exerts an adverse effect on the balance sheets of banks, which are forced to sell
assets, and contract the supply of credit to firms. As a consequence, aggregate invest-
ment falls and dampens the initial output stimulus of the government spending shock.
I show that whether the contribution of the fiscal stress channel to the response of
output, and hence to the government spending multiplier, is quantitatively important
depends on the order of approximation that is employed to solve the model. In the
linearized model, the effect of the degree of fiscal stress on the government spending
multiplier is negligible. In contrast to this, fiscal stress can play a sizable role for the
size of the multiplier, if the model is solved using a third-order approximation to
equilibrium dynamics. The reason is that aggregate risk affects the transmission of the
government spending shock. In particular, it amplifies the reduction of credit and
investment, which can be explained by a precautionary motive of banks, who react
more sensitive to variation in asset prices following the shock. As a result, the output
stimulus induced by the shock, and the government spending multiplier is decreased
by the presence of fiscal stress.
Considering the role of aggregate risk for the transmission of the government
spending shock is novel in the literature on government spending multipliers.
Importantly, accounting for risk allows me to establish the empirically observed
link between the degree of fiscal stress and the size of the government spending
multiplier. I show that the fiscal stress channel for the multiplier becomes more
important, the higher the initial degree of fiscal stress, in which government
spending is increased, the higher the sensitivity of fiscal stress to fluctuations in the
debt-to-GDP ratio, and the stronger the motive of banks to delever in the face of the
shock. For a calibration, that captures some of the key features of the recent debt cri-
sis in Italy, the cumulative government spending multiplier can even become negative.
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While this paper offers a theoretical explanation for the empirical link between fiscal
stress and the size of the multiplier, it does not attempt a full-fledged analysis of a
sovereign risk crisis. Instead it focusses on a key mechanism, and highlights the role of
risk for the fiscal stress channel. Additionally, episodes with increased sovereign default
risk can be associated with steep recessions, or liquidity problems of the agents in the
economy, that may affect the government spending multiplier. Furthermore, aspects
such as distortionary taxation, the political economy, unconventional monetary policy,
and open economy considerations are omitted from the analysis to focus on the
contribution of the fiscal stress channel to the government spending multiplier. The
many possible extensions of the analysis yield an interesting field of future research.

Chapter 4
The Government Spending Multiplier,
Fiscal Stress, and the Zero Lower
Bound
Abstract
The recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone was characterized by a
monetary policy, which has been constrained by the zero lower bound
(ZLB) on nominal interest rates, and several countries, which faced high
risk spreads on their sovereign bonds. How is the government spending
multiplier affected by such an economic environment? While prominent
results in the academic literature point to high government spending
multipliers at the ZLB, higher public indebtedness is often associated with
small government spending multipliers. I develop a DSGE model with
leverage constrained banks that captures both features of this economic
environment, the ZLB and fiscal stress. In this model, I analyze the effects
of government spending shocks. I find that not only are multipliers large at
the ZLB, the presence of fiscal stress can even increase their size. For longer
durations of the ZLB, multipliers in this model can be considerably larger
than one.
Keywords: Government spending multiplier; Fiscal stress; Zero lower
bound; Financial frictions
JEL Classification: E32, E 44, E62, H30, H60
4.1 Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, which started in 2007, several European countries
have experienced deep and persistent recessions as well as spiking sovereign
yield spreads. At the same time, the ECB eased its monetary policy until the main
refinancing rate hit the zero lower bound (ZLB). In this situation, these countries
faced two challenges simultaneously: restoring the sustainability of their public
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finances while limiting the deep recession. With monetary policy being constrained
by the ZLB, fiscal policy came into the focus of the public policy debate. While
countries under fiscal stress ran policies of fiscal austerity, which included cuts
to government spending, to stabilize their public debt, it is far from clear to what
extent the government spending cuts contributed to the contraction of aggregate
output in these countries. On the one hand, prominent result point toward large
government spending multipliers at the ZLB,1 on the other hand, higher public
indebtedness is often associated with small government spending multipliers.2 This
paper investigates on the size of the government spending multiplier in the context of
a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks that captures both features of this
economic environment, the ZLB and fiscal stress.
For the analysis, I use the model developed by (Strobel, 2017). The degree of fiscal
stress is captured by the probability of a sovereign default, which is modeled as a
fiscal limit function. This function maps the debt-to-GDP ratio into the probability
of a sovereign default.3 Thus, to the extent that government spending shocks
drive changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio, they affect the degree of fiscal stress. As
documented by (Battistini et al., 2014), banks in those eurozone countries, which
experienced spiking sovereign yield spreads, increased their exposure to domestic
sovereign bonds, making their financial position more vulnerable to variations in the
degree of fiscal stress. The link between fiscal and financial fragility is captured in my
framework, by leveraged constrained banks à la (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), which
hold government bonds next to private capital assets on their balance sheets. Hence,
changes in government spending can directly affect the supply of credit by banks to
non-financial firms and influence aggregate investment in the economy. Following
(Gertler and Karadi, 2011), I simulate a negative capital quality shock to trigger a
financial crisis scenario in which the economy is forced to the ZLB on nominal interest
rates, and compare government spending multipliers in the state, in which the ZLB
constraint is slack, to multipliers in the state, in which the ZLB constraint is binding.
To solve the model with the occasionally binding constraint, I employ the piece-wise
linear approach by (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015) and their software toolkit OccBin.
In the baseline scenario of the model, the cumulative government spending multiplier
over 20 quarters is roughly 0.39 when the ZLB constraint is not binding. When
the economy is not at the ZLB, I find that an increase in government spending
raises the debt-to-GDP ratio and thereby the degree of fiscal stress, lowering the
price of government bonds and capital assets, and raising the loan rate. Hence, the
1see, e.g., (Christiano et al., 2011) and (Eggertson and Krugman, 2012)
2see, e.g., (Alesina and Perotti, 1997), (Perotti, 1999), (Corsetti et al., 2013)
3Fiscal limit functions of various functional forms have been among others by (Leeper and Walker,
2011), (Bi and Traum, 2012a), (Corsetti et al., 2013)
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increase in the degree of fiscal stress contributes to a crowding-out of investment
and lowers the government spending multiplier. However, as in (Strobel, 2017), the
log-linear dynamics of the model imply that the size of the effect of fiscal stress on the
government spending multiplier is negligible, when the ZLB constraint is slack.
When the ZLB constraint is binding however, the picture changes drastically. In this
state, the output response to a positive shock to government spending is far larger,
and an expansionary fiscal policy now manages to improve the financial condition of
banks and to crowd in investment. The longer the duration of the ZLB episode, the
larger the government spending multiplier. Multipliers in this model can become
larger than two. Also the effect of the fiscal stress channel on the multiplier is reversed,
when monetary policy is constrained and contributes positively to the multiplier.
As emphasized by (Eggertson, 2011) and (Christiano et al., 2011), the key to the
different sizes of multipliers at the ZLB is the reversed effect of government spending
shocks on the real interest rate. An expansion of government spending raises aggregate
demand and triggers an increase in output and inflation. In normal times, when the
central bank follows the Taylor principle for nominal interest rates, this causes the
real interest rate to go up as well.
At the ZLB the effect on the real interest rate changes. In the scenario at hand,
the capital quality shock that triggers the crisis, causes inflation to drop. With
monetary policy constrained and nominal interest rates stuck at zero, the expectations
of a persistent deflation translates into a rising real interest rate. An increase in
government spending that raises aggregate demand and exerts inflationary pressure
therefore leads to a decrease in the real interest rate. Thus, expansionary fiscal policy
makes investment more attractive, when the economy is at the ZLB. The presence
of the fiscal stress channel in my model does not undo this intuition, but rather
strengthens it. Despite the growing public debt after a positive government spending
shock, the large output response lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio and the degree of fiscal
stress. Particularly, for higher levels of public indebtedness, for which the default
probability is more sensitive to movements in underlying fundamentals, the falling
degree of fiscal stress raises bond prices and strengthens the balance sheet of banks
and their ability to supply credit. Hence, the fiscal stress channel further amplifies the
investment boom, and contributes to a large multiplier at the ZLB.
Empirical evidence on the government spending multipliers at the ZLB is scant as
ZLB episodes have been rare in industrialized countries. (Miyamoto et al., 2016)
analyze the case of Japan in which the policy rate has been close to or at the ZLB since
the mid 1990’s. Using local projection methods, they estimate the output multiplier
in Japan to be 1.5 at the ZLB and 0.6 when the ZLB is not binding. Their results are
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roughly in line with the multipliers, I obtain in my paper. Empirical papers, that study
cases outside of Japan, have to rely either on historical data or on the few years of
the Great Recession. (Ramey and Zubairy, 2014) analyze US data reaching back to
1889, including two ZLB episodes. While the government spending multiplier is not
significantly different from normal times in an estimation over the entire sample, it
becomes significantly larger, when the ZLB episode around World War II is excluded
and only the Great Recession remains. For the interwar period in the UK, in which
the interest rates were at the lower bound, (Crafts and Mills, 2013) find government
spending multipliers below one for different shock identification schemes.
In the theoretical literature on the government spending multiplier, a large multiplier
at the ZLB is a recurring result.4 This result is in almost all cases explained by the
non-standard reaction of the real interest rate to government spending shocks
explained above. In his careful analysis of the effects of different fiscal policy shocks
at the ZLB, (Eggertson, 2011) obtains a government spending multiplier of 2.3.
(Christiano et al., 2011) find roughly the same value.
On the other hand, empirical evidence on the role of fiscal stress for the size of the
government spending multiplier generally suggests that higher public debt, higher
deficits or higher sovereign yield spreads are associated with small government
spending multipliers.5 Some results even point to negative multipliers for countries,
which are highly indebted. (Ilzetzki et al., 2013) estimate the long run multiplier to
be negative three. Theoretical models that investigate the role of fiscal stress for the
government spending multipliers offer different explanations for the observation of
‘expansionary fiscal contractions’. (Bertola and Drazen, 1993) argue that, if a fiscal
contraction is associated with a shift to a sustainable path of government debt, it
can spur expectations of future economic growth and stimulate consumption by
households. (Strobel, 2017) focusses on the role of investment dynamics for small
multipliers in times of fiscal stress. In his model, the crowding-out of aggregate invest-
ment is induced by increasing bank loan rates that co-move with rising sovereign
yield spreads. The model in this paper is solved with a third order approximation
to equilibrium dynamic. When risk and the precautionary motive by banks are
accounted for, banks react very sensitive to increasing degrees of fiscal stress, rapidly
reducing their exposure to assets with a stochastic return, and sharply contracting
the supply of loans to firms, such that, in this situation, output can contract after the
4see, e.g., (Woodford, 2010), (Christiano et al., 2011), (Eggertson, 2011), (Eggertson and Krugman,
2012), (Aloui and Eyquem, 2016). As a caveat, however, one should point out that most of these results
are obtained relying on log-linear equilibrium conditions. Recently, (Boneva et al., 2016) showed that in
the context of a small New-Keynesian model, which is solved non-linearly, the size of the multiplier is
very sensitive to the calibration of the model and can take very different values for plausible calibrations.
5see, e.g., (Alesina and Perotti, 1997), (Perotti, 1999) (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), (Corsetti et al.,
2012), (Guajardo et al., 2014)
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fiscal expansion. The paper at hand builds on the same model but focusses on the
role of the ZLB, instead of the role of risk for the relationship between fiscal stress and
the multiplier.
The papers closest to the one presented here are (Corsetti et al., 2013) and (Aloui and
Eyquem, 2016). Both analyze the multiplier in a model that takes account of both,
fiscal stress and the ZLB. In the context of a small New-Keynesian model with banks à
la (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2011) and a fiscal limit function, (Corsetti et al., 2013) find
that multipliers can actually be smaller at the ZLB, as in this situation monetary policy
cannot counter the recessionary effects of sharply increasing sovereign yield spreads.
However, more recently, (Aloui and Eyquem, 2016) extend the model by (Corsetti
et al., 2013) with capital formation, investment adjustment costs and distortionary
labor taxes, and show that in the extended model, the typical result that multipliers
are increased by the ZLB is restored. While my framework differs along various
dimensions from theirs, I confirm the finding by (Aloui and Eyquem, 2016). In my
model as well, the ZLB dominates the fiscal stress channel as a determinant of the
size of the government spending multiplier leading to a multiplier’s size that is in the
range of values typically found in the related literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two gives a brief overview
of the model. Section three discusses the calibration and the solution method. The
fourth section introduces the crisis experiment, analyzes the dynamic consequences
of government spending shocks at the ZLB, and discusses government spending
multipliers for different lengths of the ZLB period and different levels of indebtedness.
Section five concludes.
4.2 The model
For the analysis in this paper, I use the model developed by (Strobel, 2017). It is a New
Keynesian model featuring leverage constrained banks as in (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
Households consume, supply labor and save in the form of bank deposits. Period
utility is separable in leisure and consumption with internal habit formation. The
firm sector consists of three types of firms. Intermediate good producers use labor
and capital in their production. They sell their depreciated capital each period to
capital good firms, which make their investment decisions taking into account convex
investment adjustment costs. The intermediate good producers then repurchase new
capital from the capital good producers, financing their purchases with loans from
banks. Lastly, retailers, that act under monopolistic competition and price stickiness,
buy the output of the intermediate good firms, repackage the goods and sell them as
final goods.
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Banks fund the extension of loans as well as purchases of government bonds with
deposits made by households and with their own net worth. The process of financial
intermediation is subject to a friction. Each period, bankers have the option to divert
a fixed fraction of their assets and exit the banking sector. They choose to do so, if
the value of diverting assets is larger than the expected value of continuing their
business in the banking sector. In that case, households loose their deposits. Hence,
in equilibrium, depositors will allow banks to acquire assets only up to the point, in
which the value of operating bank’s business is as large as the value of diverting a
fraction of their assets. As a consequence, given their net worth, banks are constrained
in their leverage ratio.
Government bonds are long-term bonds, and are subject to default risk. Their default
probability is expressed as a function of the debt-to-GDP ratio as in (Bi and Traum,
2012a). Furthermore, the government funds its expenditures with non-distortionary
lump sum taxes. Monetary policy is modeled in form of a Taylor rule. Since the details
of the model have been discussed in (Strobel, 2017), I turn directly to the equilibrium
conditions of the model.
Some equilibrium conditions
The Euler equation of consumption reads
1= EtβΛt ,t+1Rt , (4.1)
where β is the households discount factor, Rt is the return on bank deposits.Λt ,t+1 ≡
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
, whereUc,t is the marginal utility of consumption
Uc,t = (Ct −hCt−1)−1−βhEt (Ct+1−hCt )−1. (4.2)
Ct denotes consumption in period t and h is the parameter for internal habit forma-
tion. Household supply their labor to intermediate good producers according to the
condition
Wt =
χLφt
Uc,t
, (4.3)
where Wt is the real wage and Lt denotes labor hours. Parameter φ is the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity and χ is the weight of the disutility of labor in the period
utility function of the household. The production function of the intermediate good
producers reads
Ym,t = At (ξtKt−1)αL1−αt , (4.4)
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where Ym,t ,At , ξt and Kt are intermediate output, total factor productivity, the quality
of the employed capital, and capital, respectively. Parameter α is defined to be the
output elasticity of capital. The optimal demand for labor and capital can be are
written as
Rk,t+1 =
Pm,t+1α
Ym,t+1
Kt
+ (1−δ)Qt+1ξt+1
Qt
, (4.5)
Wt = Pm,t (1−α)
Ym,t
Lt
. (4.6)
Rkt denotes the return on capital, Pm,t is the price of the intermediate good and Qt
is the price of the capital good. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of capital. As in
(Gertler and Karadi, 2011), the law of motion of capital is affected by the quality of
capital
Kt = (1−δ)ξtKt−1+ It (4.7)
The optimal decision on investment, It , is intertemporal due to the presence of in-
vestment adjustment costs, f
(
It
It−1
)
≡ ηi2
(
It
It−1 −1
)2
. Parameter ηi denotes the inverse
elasticity of investment to the price of capital
Qt = 1+ f
(
It
It−1
)
+ It
It−1
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
−EtβΛt ,t+1
(
It
It−1
)2
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
. (4.8)
Due to the assumption of nominal rigidities as in (Calvo, 1983), the price index reads
Π1−²t = (1−γ)(Π∗t )1−²+γΠ
γp (1−²)
t−1 , (4.9)
where Πt is gross inflation and Π∗t denotes the optimal price from the viewpoint
of firms in period t divided by the past price level. Parameter ² is the elasticity of
substitution between different varieties of final goods, γ is the share of firms that
cannot update their price in any given period, and γp governs the degree of price
indexation. Retailers determine the optimal price,Π∗t , as a function of their current
and future marginal cost, which is equivalent to the price of the intermediate good,
Pm,t , such that
Π∗t =
²
²−1
Ft
Zt
Πt , (4.10)
where Ft and Zt are defined as Ft ≡ Ym,tPm,t + βγΛt ,t+1Π²t+1Π
−γp²
t Ft+1 and
Zt ≡ Ym,t +βγΛt ,t+1Π²−1t+1Π
−γp (²−1)
t Zt+1. Up to a first order approximation, aggregate
final good output Yt is equivalent to aggregate intermediate good output.
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Banks extend loans to the intermediate good producers, and hold government bonds,
Bt , on their balance sheets. They fund their operations with deposits from the house-
holds, D t , and their own net worth, Nt . Their balance sheet thus reads
QtKt +Qbt Bt =D t +Nt , (4.11)
where Qbt is the price of government bonds. The banking sector consists of a contin-
uum of banks. Each bank remains in the sector in any given period with probability
θ and exits the sector otherwise. Exiting bankers consume out of their accumulated
net worth. The accumulation of the aggregate net worth of those banks who remain
in the banking sector in any given period, Not , is governed by the return on capital
and bonds, Rkt and Rbt respectively, as well as by the return they have to pay on their
deposits
Not = θ
[
RktQt−1Kt−1+RbtQbt−1Bt−1−Rt−1D t−1
]
. (4.12)
New bankers that enter the business receive an initial endowment that is a fraction of
last periods assets, Nnt =ω
[
QtKt−1+Qbt Bt−1
]
. Accordingly, it holds that Nt =Not +
Nnt . Additionally, each period, bankers have the option to divert a fraction of their
assets and close their bank. As a result, bankers aim to maximize the value of their
net worth at their expected time of departure from the sector, subject to an incentive
constraint that prescribes that the value of remaining in the business, Vt , must be
larger or equal than the value of the fractions of capital assets and bonds that they can
divert. Thus,
Vt ≥λQtKt +λbQbt Bt (4.13)
with λ> 0 and λb > 0. In this environment, the marginal values of an additional unit
of capital or bonds on the bank’s asset side, νkt and νbt respectively, and the marginal
value of an additional unit of net worth, νnt , are function of the return on the assets
and deposits
νkt = EtΩt ,t+1(Rk,t+1−Rt ), (4.14)
νbt = EtΩt ,t+1(Rb,t+1−Rt ), (4.15)
νnt = EtΩt ,t+1Rt . (4.16)
The stochastic discount factor of the bank,Ωt , reflects the stochastic discount factor
of the household, and the financial conditions of the bank
Ωt ,t+1 ≡βΛt ,t+1[(1−θ)+θ(1+µt+1)νn,t+1]. (4.17)
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µt is the Lagrangian multiplier of the incentive constraint. The banks’ demand for
loans can be described as a function of government bond holdings and the amount of
net worth of the banking sector
QtKt = νbt −λb
λ−νkt
Qbt Bt +
νnt
λ−νkt
Nt . (4.18)
Two further optimality conditions that result from the banks optimization problem
pin down the relationship of the marginal values of holding either asset. These are
determined by the fraction of the respective assets that can be diverted, and the
Lagrangian multiplier of the incentive constraint, which indicates the banks’ capability
to hold assets on their balance sheets,
νkt =λ
µt
1+µt
, (4.19)
νbt =λb
µt
1+µt
. (4.20)
Finally, the leverage ratio of banks is defined as φt ≡ QtKt+Q
b
t Bt
Nt
.
Government spending, Gt , is exogenous. The government finances its expenditures
with lump sum taxes, Tt , that follow a tax rule, Tt = T +κb(Bt−1−B)+κg (Gt −G),
where the parameters κb > 0 and κb > 0 determine the size of the feedback of taxes to
changes in public debt and government spending. The government budget constraint
reads
Gt +Qbt Bt =RbtQbt−1Bt−1+Tt . (4.21)
The return of government bonds reflects that the government defaults on its debt
with probabilityΦt and that the size of the haircut in case of default is D. Bonds are
modeled as geometrically decaying consoles to allow for matching a realistic average
maturity of the outstanding bonds. Hence, further determinants of the return are the
decay rate, ρc , and the coupon, rc . The return on bonds reads
Rb,t = (1−∆dt ∗D)
[
rc +ρcQbt
Qbt−1
]
. (4.22)
Key to the fiscal stress channel on the multiplier is the sovereign default probability
that is linked to the debt-to-GDP ratio via the logistic distribution function
∆dt =
exp
(
η1+η2 Bt4Yt )
)
1+exp
(
η1+η2 Bt4Yt
) . (4.23)
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This function implies that the default probability is more sensitive to fluctuations of the
debt-to-GDP ratio, for higher levels of public indebtedness. Monetary policy follows a
Taylor rule. The nominal interest rate is non-negative. When the ZLB constraint is not
binding, the central bank reacts to fluctuations in the net inflation rate, pit and of the
log deviation of the real marginal cost from the viewpoint of the final good producer,
Pˆm,t
it =max(0,[i +κpipit +κy Pˆmt ]). (4.24)
For the model to render a unique rational expectation equilibrium in the neighbor-
hood of the deterministic steady state, it has to hold that κpi > 1. The Fisher equation
is 1+ it =RtEtΠt+1. Closing the good market clearing condition reads
Yt =Ct + It + f
(
It
It−1
)
It +Gt . (4.25)
The stochastic disturbances that drive the dynamics of the model are the capital
quality shock, and the government spending shock, which follow the AR(1)-processes
g t = ρg g t−1+²gt , (4.26)
ξt = ρξξt−1+²ξt . (4.27)
4.3 Calibration and solution method
Calibration
The calibration of the parameters is chosen to match key features of the Italian econ-
omy since its accession to the Eurozone. Parameter β, the discount factor of the
household, is set to 0.995, instead of the conventional 0.99. Increasing the discount
factor implies a lower interest rate at the steady state of the model moving it closer
to the ZLB. As a consequence, the solution method, which is discussed in the next
subsection, reliably generates solutions for scenarios, in which the economy remains
up to five periods at the ZLB, and across different calibrations for the debt-to-GDP
ratio. All other parameters are set in accordance with the calibration of the model
in (Strobel, 2017). As in that paper, the main sources for the calibration are (Bi and
Traum, 2012a), who estimate a structural model with sovereign default risk on Italian
data between 1999Q1 and 2010Q4, and (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), who developed the
core structure of the model used in the paper at hand. Table 1 lists the values of the
model parameters.
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Table 4.1: Calibration of Parameters
β discount factor 0.995
h habit formation 0.14 Bi and Traum (2012)
χ weight for disutility of labor 4.7125
ϕ inverse of Frisch elasticity 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
α effective capital share 0.33 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
δ depreciation param. 0.025 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ηi invest. adjust. param. 1.728 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
² elasticity of substitution 4,167 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γ Calvo param. 0.779 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γp price indexation param. 0.241 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Rk−R steady state spread 0.01 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Rb−R steady state spread 0.005 Bocola (2015)
λ divertibility of capital assets 0.4479
λb divertibility of bonds 0.2239
θ survival probability of banker 0.975 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ω transfer to new bankers 0.0018
κpi interest rate rule 1.5 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
κy interest rate rule -0.125 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
G/Y share of gov. spending 0.1966 Bi and Traum (2012)
B/4Y debt-to-GDP ratio. 1.19 Bi and Traum (2012)
κb tax rule param. 0.3 Bi and Traum (2012)
κg tax rule param. 0.53 Bi and Traum (2012)
η1 fiscal limit parameter -21.5285 Bi and Traum (2012)
η2 fiscal limit parameter 3.4015 Bi and Traum (2012)
D haircut 0.378 Bi and Traum (2012)
rc coupon rate 0.04 v.d.Kwaak and v. Wijnbergen
(2014)
ρc rate of decay of consol 0.96 v.d.Kwaak and v. Wijnbergen
(2014)
ρi intrest rate smoothing 0.0 v.d.Kwaak and v. Wijnbergen
(2014)
ρξ persistence of ξ-shock 0.66 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρg persistence of g-shock 0.84 Bi and Traum (2012)
σξ std. of ξ-shock 0.01
σg std. of g-shock 0.01 Bi and Traum (2012)
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Solution method
To deal with the occasionally binding ZLB constraint, I employ the piecewise-linear
approach by (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015). This approach treats models with occa-
sionally binding constraints as models with two different regimes: one in which the
constraint is binding and one in which it is slack. The model is linearized around a
reference point, here the deterministic steady state. (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015)
refer to this state as the reference regime, and other one the alternative regime. Their
approach requires two conditions to be fulfilled. First, the conditions for existence
of a rational expectation equilibrium laid out by (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) have to
hold in the reference regime. Secondly, if shocks move the economy away from the
reference and into the alternative regime, it has to return to the reference regime in
finite time. Both conditions hold in the case at hand.
In this paper, the ZLB constraint is slack in the reference regime, and binding in the
alternative regime. At the reference regimes, the rational expectation equilibrium of
the model can be described as
A EtX t+1+BX t +C X t−1+E ²t = 0, (4.28)
where X t is the vector of n endogenous variables, ²t is the vector of m exogenous
disturbances, and the elements of the matricesA ,B,C , (each of size n×n) and E (of
size n×m) are functions of the structural parameters of the model. At the alternative
regime, the rational expectation equilibrium of the model can be described as
A ∗EtX t+1+B∗X t +C ∗X t−1++D∗+E ∗²t = 0. (4.29)
A ∗,B∗,C ∗, and E ∗ are matrices that are analogous toA ,B,C , and E .D∗is a vector
of parameters of size n, which corrects for the fact that the linearization is carried out
around the deterministic steady state, in which the reference regime applies. Given
initial conditions X0 and a sequence of shocks, the solution to this model is a policy
function6
X t =P tX t−1+Rt +Qt²t , (4.30)
where matricesP t (n×n),Rt (n×1), andQt (n×m) are regime-dependent andRt = 0
at the reference regime. The solution algorithm starts with a guess for the period, in
which the economy returns to the reference regime, and for the regime in each period
up to the final return period. Then it solves for the policy function at the date in which
the economy has just returned to the reference regime, plugs the policy function into
the equilibrium conditions for the alternative regime, and applies backward induction
6In their definition of a solution for the model, (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015) focus at the case, in
which there is only a shock in period 1. However, their software package Occbin allows for shocks in
subsequent periods as well.
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to trace the equilibrium path back to the initial period, applying either system (4.28) or
system (4.29) at any given period along the path, depending on whether the economy
is at the ZLB or not according to the guess. Finally, the initial guess is either verified or
updated until a guess has been verified.
How long the economy remains at the ZLB depends on the model structure and on
the size of the shock that pushes the economy to the ZLB. An attractive property of the
solution is that the expectation of how long the ZLB regime will last, already affects
the decisions by the agents contemporaneously.7 An advantage of using the piecewise-
linear approach is that, at it relies on perturbation methods, it is easily applicable to
medium-scale models such as the one being used for the analysis in this paper.
4.4 Crisis scenario and government spending stimulus
To trigger the crisis that moves the economy to the ZLB, I simulate a negative shock,
as it is done in (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).8 I consider different lengths of the duration
of the ZLB and compare government spending multipliers across different initial
calibration of the debt-to-GDP ratios and different durations of the ZLB period. For
each steady state value of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and for each desired duration of the
ZLB, I adjust the size of the capital quality shock accordingly.
In order to illustrate the effects of the fiscal stress channel for the output effects of the
shock, I compare the full model described in section 2 with a model in which the fiscal
stress channel is shut off. Here, I eliminate equation (4.23) from the model, and set
variableΦt to a constant value (i.e.,Φt =Φ ∀t ).9 In all other aspects the two models
are identical. I refer to the latter model as the model without fiscal stress.
4.4.1 Crisis scenario
Figure (4.1) illustrates the consequences of a fall in capital quality of four percent
that pushes the economy to the ZLB for four quarters. In this particular case, the
debt-to-GDP ratio is calibrated to 1.19, which is the average debt-to-GDP ratio in
the sample considered by (Bi and Traum, 2012a) in the estimation of their structural
model. The dashed lines represent the responses of the variables in the linear case,
which ignores the ZLB and the solid lines depict the responses of the variables
generated by the piecewise linear solution, which takes the ZLB into account. Black
7This stands in contrast to algorithms, in which the model’s return to the reference regime, is
determined each period anew, according to a stochastic process (see, e.g., (Eggertson and Woodford,
2003)).
8(Gertler and Karadi, 2011) liken this shock to a sudden economic depreciation or obsolescence of
capital. Often, to trigger a zero bound episode, a shock to the discount factor that raises the agents
desire to save is used. However, in the model at hand this shock has the undesirable feature that it
increases aggregate investment in crisis times. The capital quality shock circumvents this pitfall.
9The value ofΦt in the deterministic steady state, is the same in both models.
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lines show the responses of the full model. Blue lines show the model in which the
fiscal stress channel is eliminated.
In each scenario in figure (4.1), the exogenous decline in capital quality effectively
reduces the productive capital stock on impact. As a consequence, aggregate output
falls and so does consumption of households. The lower stock of effective capital
reduces the marginal product of labor, and consequently the demand for labor falls,
leading to a decline in equilibrium hours worked.
An additional consequence of the lower quality of capital is that the price of capital
assets falls. With the subsequent deterioration of the banks’ balance sheets, their
shrinking net worth forces banks to sell off assets, amplifying the fall in the price of
capital. The leverage ratio increases, and so does the spread of the return on capital
(loans of the bank to firms) over the return on deposits. The ensuing credit crunch
causes aggregate investment to drop. A second reaction by banks to the capital quality
shock is to change the composition of their asset holdings. In a flight to the relatively
less affected assets, they increase the share of government bonds in their portfolio.
Thus, in contrast to the fall in capital assets, the amount of government bonds held by
banks increases.
How does the fiscal stress affect the dynamic consequences of the capital quality
shock? As the sovereign default probability goes up together with the debt-to-GDP
ratio, the price of government bonds falls by more than in the case, in which the fiscal
stress channel is inactive. Similarly, the spread on bonds over deposits increases
more sharply. With the price of bonds being more sensitive to the shock, bonds lose
some attractiveness as a save haven and the portfolio shift towards government
bonds is less pronounced. Instead, the banks net worth falls more than in the
scenario, in which the fiscal stress channel is inactive, and the leverage ratio as
well as the credit spreads increases by more in this case. Hence, the contraction in
the supply of credit is stronger than in the case without the fiscal stress channel,
deepening the fall in aggregate investment and output. The pro-cyclical amplification
of the financial accelerator is therefore stronger, when the fiscal stress channel is active.
What is the role of the ZLB constraint for the equilibrium dynamics after the negative
capital quality shock? In response to the shock, the central bank lowers its nominal
rate to counter the deflationary push and to stimulate the economy. In the simulation
in which the ZLB is neglected, the nominal policy rate is lowered to minus 2 percentage
points. In the simulation, in which the ZLB is accounted for, the nominal rate falls
to zero and the ZLB binds for 4 periods (solid lines). When the ZLB is binding, the
ability of the central bank to stimulate aggregate demand and to offset the downturn
is constrained. Thus, while the dynamic consequences of the shock are qualitatively
4.4. CRISIS SCENARIO AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING STIMULUS 75
similar to the simulation, in which the ZLB is neglected, the size of the recessionary
impact of the shock is larger. At its trough, output decreases in the case with the ZLB
and the fiscal stress channel by roughly 4,5 percent compared to 4 percent in the case
without the ZLB constraint. With the magnified contraction of real activity, the distress
in the banking sector increases, amplifying the rise in the spreads and the leverage
ratios and the decline in asset prices, net worth and aggregate investment. As in the
scenario without the ZLB, the fiscal stress channel adds to the vulnerability of the
banks’ balance sheets, and magnifies the financial accelerator in the downturn.
4.4.2 The government spending shock
Against the backdrop of the crisis described in the foregoing subsection, I simulate
a government spending stimulus of the size of one percent of steady state output
(i.e. five percent of steady state government expenditures) and compare the effects
across the four scenarios introduced in the last subsection. The presence of the ZLB
has important qualitative effects for the consequences of the government spending
stimulus. The dynamic consequences of the government spending shock for the
simulation in which the ZLB is ignored, are discussed in detail in (Strobel, 2017).
In figure (4.2) they are depicted as the dashed lines (blue - without the fiscal stress
channel, black - with an active fiscal stress channel).10
The expansion of government spending increases output and government debt alike.
The increase in output is stronger on impact, but less persistent, than the growth in
public debt. The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP are mirrored by the movements in
the default probability. The increase in output raises the inflation rate, triggering
a response by the central bank, which raises its policy rate. Government spending
crowds out private consumption of Ricardian consumers and equilibrium hours
increase, raising the marginal product of capital, and as a consequence, also the
return on capital assets. In equilibrium, this is accompanied by an increase in the loan
rate. The demand for bank loans contracts and as a consequence, the price of capital
assets, as well as aggregate investment and the capital stock fall in response to the
government spending shock.11
As in the case of the capital quality shock, banks react with both, a change in the
size of their balance sheet as well as with a change in the composition. The fall in
the equilibrium prices of capital assets and government bonds results in a shrinking
10For each of the scenarios, I simulate the equilibrium dynamics once in response to the capital
quality shock and the government spending shock, and once with only the capital quality shock. Then,
I subtract the results of the latter simulation from the former with both shocks. Figure (4.2) displays the
results: the isolated effect of the government spending shock on the equilibrium path.
11For empirical evidence on the crowding out of investment by government spending increases, see,
e.g., (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), (Ramey, 2011b), (Ilzetzki et al., 2013)
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Figure 4.1: Dynamic consequence of a negative capital quality shock. The size of the shock
is calibrated to make the zero lower bound binding for 4 periods. The debt-to-GDP ratio is
calibrated to 1.19.
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net worth of banks, who have to sell assets and reduce the credit supply, in order to
satisfy their constraint on the leverage ratio. Hence, the contraction of the balance
sheet and of the supply of credit amplifies the crowding-out of investment. Secondly,
the increase of public debt through the government spending stimulus leads to
a crowding-out of capital assets on the balance sheets of banks, further reducing
the loan supply, aggregate investment and the output stimulus by the government
spending shock.
Lastly, when the fiscal stress channel is active, variations in the default probability
lower the price of government bonds and raise the distress in the banking sector,
expressed by higher spreads on credit and bonds, and a lower net worth of banks.
However, as emphasized in (Strobel, 2017), the effects of the fiscal stress channel are
quantitatively negligible.
At the ZLB, the effects of government spending shocks change drastically. As in
(Christiano et al., 2011) and (Eggertson, 2011), the output stimulus of the government
spending shock is far stronger at the ZLB. The capital quality shock that triggers
the ZLB period, leads to a deep recession associated with strong deflationary
tendencies. When the nominal interest rate is constrained to be zero, expected
deflation translates into a rise in the real interest rate, which incentivizes households
to delay consumption and which makes investment less attractive to firms. In this
situation, the increase in government spending dampens the fall in aggregate demand
and counters the deflationary tendencies. As figure (4.2) shows, the positive impact
of the government shock on inflation is far stronger at the ZLB. As long as nominal
rate is at zero, the push in inflation dampens the increase in the real interest rate.
As a consequence, it becomes more attractive for firms to invest and aggregate
investment is now even crowded-in by the government spending shock. The surge
in investment demand results in a growing capital stock and an increasing price of
capital assets at the ZLB. Hence, at the ZLB the effect of government spending is
to bolster the net worth of banks, to lower their leverage ratio and to expand their
ability to hold assets and to supply loans. This further amplifies the investment
boom, and contributes to the stronger rise in aggregate output after the government
spending shock. The consumption of Ricardian households is still crowded out by the
government spending shock, due to the wealth effect on the labor supply, but this
effect is much weaker than away from the ZLB.
Similarly, the role of the fiscal stress channel for the effects of the government spend-
ing shock is reversed at the ZLB. Here, the expansion of output is strong enough to
decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio, and thus the default probability of government bonds.
Consequently, the price of bond increases by more than in the simulation without
the fiscal stress channel. In equilibrium, this positive effect spills over to the price
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of capital. As a result, the net worth of banks is further bolstered, and the leverage
ratio is lower than in the scenario with fiscal stress. Whereas the spreads of credit and
government bonds over the deposit rate still increase slightly, when the fiscal stress
channel is inactive, they fall in the scenario, in which the fiscal stress channel further
contributes to a decline in the return on capital and bonds as well as to falling spreads.
The crowding-in of investment is more pronounced and the capital accumulation
accelerated.
Overall, the fall of the sovereign default probability due to the strong expansion
of output after the government spending stimulus further raises the government
spending multiplier.
Figure (4.3) displays the cumulative government spending multiplier over a time
horizon of 20 quarters for different steady state levels of public indebtedness
and different lengths of the ZLB episode. Since its accession to the Eurozone, the
stock of Italian public debt fluctuated between 100 and 132 percent of Italy’s GDP.
The debt-to-GDP ratios in the four panels are chosen accordingly.12 For each of
these calibrations, I conduct simulations with ZLB episodes up to five periods.
As one can see, in the linear scenario the fiscal stress channel hardly affects the
government spending multiplier. The blue and the black dashed lines are virtually
indistinguishable. Again, this is in line with the results by (Strobel, 2017).
For the simulations, in which the ZLB constraint is accounted for, three results stand
out. First, at the ZLB government spending multipliers can become much larger than
in normal time, regardless of the level of public debt.
Secondly, across different levels of public indebtedness the government spending
multiplier increases quickly with the duration of the ZLB period. Longer ZLB periods
reflect deeper recessions, which are triggered by larger negative capital quality shocks.
The deeper the crisis, the stronger is the deflationary pressure induced by the shock.
Consequently, an expansion of government spending dampens a stronger deflation
for more periods, until the economy leaves the ZLB. Thus, the spending stimulus
lowers the real interest rate for longer and stimulates investment by more, the longer
the ZLB period. In these simulations, the government spending multiplier quickly
becomes larger than one and reaches up to roughly 2.3. Again, this result is similar to
the prominent result by (Christiano et al., 2011) who attain large multipliers at the ZLB.
Thirdly, the positive contribution of the fiscal stress channel to the multiplier is larger
for longer ZLB episodes. This result follows naturally as a stronger expansion of aggre-
12In a larger sensitivity analysis, I tested debt-to-GDP ratios between 0.6, the threshold requested in
the Maastricht treaty, and 1.3. The fiscal stress channel is quantitatively negligible for small values of
the debt-to-GDP ratio. The results are qualitatively robust to an extension of the parameter space and
are available upon request.
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Figure 4.2: Dynamic consequence of a government spending shock of one percent of steady
state output. The size of the shock is calibrated to make the zero lower bound binding for 4
periods. The debt-to-GDP ratio is calibrated to 1.19.
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative Government Spending Multipliers over a time horizon of 20 quarters
gate output at longer ZLB periods, leads to a stronger decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio
and hence as well the default probability in the model. This improves the financial
conditions of banks, and facilitates a larger credit and investment volume.
Also, as is shown in figure (4.4), the contribution of the fiscal stress channel is generally
larger, the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio.13 This is due to the higher sensitivity of the
default probability to fluctuations in the debt-to-GDP ratio for higher levels of public
debt as implied by equation (4.23).14 For the case without fiscal stress, the relationship
between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the multiplier is generally negative at the ZLB. A
higher debt-to-GDP ratio implies a larger share of government bonds in the portfolio
of banks, serving as a buffer from the consequences of the recessionary capital quality
shock, and dampening the amplification of the crisis by the financial accelerator.
Thus, the recession and the deflation triggered by the crisis shock are less severe for
higher levels of public debt. The inflationary impulse by the government spending
13The panel for a duration of the ZLB of 5 periods is omitted. The size of the capital shock needed to
obtain a duration of 5 periods in this model varies irregularly with the calibration of the debt-to-GDP
ratio. As the size of the initial crisis shock is itself a determinant of the multiplier, the results are therefore
strongly distorted.
14The non-linear shape of this function is taken from (Bi and Traum, 2012a) and is in line with
results by panel data studies on the drivers of sovereign yield spreads in Europe, which find a stronger
sensitivity of the spreads to fundamentals in crisis times (see, e.g., (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009),
(Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013))
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative Government Spending Multipliers over a time horizon of 20 quarters
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stimulus counters a less severe deflation and therefore affects the real interest
rate by less. Accordingly, when the fiscal stress channel is inactive, the stimulus of
government spending to investment and output is weaker, for higher levels of public
debt. The same rationale holds for the cases, in which the fiscal stress channel is
active, but weak due to low levels of the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio.
When the fiscal stress channels is active and the debt-to-GDP ratio is rather high, the
default probability is more sensitive to the fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore,
in this case fiscal stress amplifies the crisis and implies a deeper fall in output and
the inflation rate. This makes the impact of the government spending shock again
stronger on the real interest rate. Additionally, an active fiscal stress channel implies, a
sharper fall in the default probability after the government spending shock, which
itself increases the output stimulus and the multiplier.
The result that the government spending multiplier at the ZLB, can be larger when
a country is higher in debt, is in contrast with the finding by (Corsetti et al., 2013),
who argue in the context of a small New Keynesian model with banks à la (Cúrdia and
Woodford, 2011) that fiscal stress affects the multiplier negatively at the ZLB. However,
it is in line with the results by (Aloui and Eyquem, 2016), who find that extending
the model by (Corsetti et al., 2013) with capital accumulation and distortionary taxes
overturns their result and establishes a positive relationship between the debt-to-
GDP ratio and the government spending multiplier at the ZLB. As my analysis differs
from theirs not only in the model features, but also in the solution method, a close
comparison of the results is, however, not straightforward.
4.5 Conclusion
In the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, several countries have conducted
government spending cuts against the backdrop of an economic environment, which
featured a high degree of fiscal stress and a monetary policy that was constrained by
the ZLB on nominal interest rates. Both features have been found to be potentially
important determinants of the size of the government spending multiplier. This paper
investigates on the size of the government spending multiplier in a model that takes
account of both features. I find that the presence of fiscal stress does not undo the
widespread notion that multipliers are large at the ZLB. In fact, the presence of a fiscal
stress channel can even increase the multiplier at the ZLB.
To the extent that shocks to government spending change the debt-to-GDP ratio, they
affect the degree of fiscal stress, and thus the prices of government bonds and capital
assets. As at the ZLB an expansion of government spending prevents a deflationary
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trap, it raises inflation expectations and lowers the real interest rate. Thereby, it stimu-
lates investment and leads to a large output response. The longer the crisis episode in
which the ZLB holds, the stronger the expansionary effect of a positive government
spending shock. Since the increase in aggregate output is strong enough to lower the
debt-to-GDP ratio despite the increasing amount of outstanding government bonds.
A fiscal expansion lowers the degree of fiscal stress, takes pressure of bank’s balance
sheets, improves their ability to lend and contributes to the investment boom. This
holds particularly when the government is highly indebted, and the default probability
reaction to variations in the debt-to-GDP ratio is more sensitive. Taking into ac-
count variations in fiscal stress, actually increases the government spending multiplier.
With my analysis, I operate at the intersection of two distinct strands of the literature,
which either focus on the effects of fiscal stress or the effects of the ZLB on the govern-
ment spending multiplier. My result is in line with the gist of the theoretical literature
on multipliers at the ZLB, which predominantly finds large multipliers. My analysis
confirms that this finding is robust to the presence of high government debt and a
fiscal stress channel in a medium scale model.
The degree of fiscal stress in the theoretical framework of this paper depends on the
reaction of the debt-to-GDP ratio to the government spending shock. (Strobel, 2017)
shows that in the same model the increase in the debt-to-GDP after the shock can raise
fiscal stress and lower the multiplier. Here, I show that the ZLB has the opposite effect
on the fiscal stress channel. The piece-wise solution method prevents me from nesting
the analysis by (Strobel, 2017), and investigating on the effects of aggregate risk and
the ZLB jointly. However, it has the advantage that it facilitates the incorporation of an
occasionally binding constraint into the analysis of a model of this size. Adjusting the
size of the model to make it suitable for a global solution to conduct the investigation
is a interesting path for future research. Alternatively, for a more complete account
of a sovereign debt crisis, the analysis can be extended to include other important
aspects that can determine the size of government spending multiplier, and that are
omitted from this analysis, such as open economy considerations, the role of private
debt, unconventional monetary policy and distortionary taxation. The investigation
of the effects of fiscal policy remains a fruitful field for future research.

Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Bank’s optimization problem
The representative bank of the model in chapter three and four maximizes its value
function subject to a balance sheet constraint and an incentive constraint
V j t = max{
K j t
}
,
{
B j t
}
,
{
D j t
} EtΛt ,t+1[(1−θ)N j t +θV j ,t+1]
s.t . QtK j t +Qbt B j t =D j t +N j t
V j t ≥λQtK j t +λbQbt B j t
In the following, I make the assumption that the incentive constraint is always binding.
Additionally, the law of motion of net worth is assumed to be
N j t = (Rkt −Rt−1)Qt−1K j ,t−1+ (Rbt −Rt−1)Qbt−1B j ,t−1+RtN j ,t−1.
Guess that the value function is linear in loans, government bonds and net worth
V j t = νk j tQtK j t +νb j tQbt B j t +νn j tN j t .
The Lagrangian function for the optimization problem of the bank reads
L = (1+µ j t )(νk j tQtK j t +νb j tQbt B j t +νn j tN j t )−µ j t (λQtK j t +λbQbt B j t )
85
86 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX
Hence, the first order conditions for loans, bonds, and the Lagrangian multiplier, µt ,
are
νk j t =λ
µ j t
1+µ j t
νb j t =λb
µ j t
1+µ j t
νk j tQtK j t +νb j tQbt B j t +νn j tN j t =λQtK j t +λbQbt B j t
The supply of loans can be obtained by rearranging the incentive constraint
QtK j t =
νb j t −λb
λ−νk j t
Qbt B j t +
νn j t
λ−νk j t
N j t
The Value function can be written solely as a function of N j t . by substituting out
private assets using the foregoing equation
V j t =νk j tQtK j t +νb j tQbt B j t +νn j tN j t
⇔V j t =
[
νk j t
νb j t −λb
λ−νk j t
+νb j t
]
Qbt B j t +
[
νkt
νn j t
λ−νk j t
+νn j t
]
N j t
⇔V j t =
[
νkt
νn j t
λ−νk j t
+νn j t
]
N j t
⇔V j t =
[
λνn j t
λ−νk j t
]
N j t
⇔V j t =
 λνn j t
λ−λ µ j t1+µ j t
N j t
⇔V j t =(νn j t (1+µ j t ))N j t
Defining:Ω j ,t ≡Λt−1,t ((1−θ)+θ(1+µ j t )νn j t ), plugging this expression of the value
function into the Bellman equation, and using the law of motion of net worth, yields
V j t = νk j tQtK j t +νb j tQbt B j t +νn j tN j t
=βEtΛt ,t+1[(1−θ)N j t +θV j ,t+1]
=βEtΩt+1((Rk,t+1−Rt )QtK j ,t + (Rb,t+1−Rt )Qbt B j ,t +RtN j ,t ).
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One can then solve for the coefficients of the value function
νk j t = βEtΩ j t+1(Rk,t+1−Rt ),
νb j t = βEtΩ j t+1(Rb,t+1−Rt ),
νd j t = βEtΩ j t+1Rt .
For aggregation, I assume an equilibrium in which all banks are symmetric (i.e.,
∀ j : νk j t = νkt ,νb j t = νbt ,νn j t = νnt ,Ω j t+1 =Ωt+1). The leverage ratio, φt , is obtained
by defining the ratio of bonds over loans in the portfolio of the bank, ςt = Q
b
t Bt
QtKt
and
starting from the incentive constraint
(λ−νkt )QtKt + (λb −νbt )Qbt Bt = νntNt
⇒ (λ−νkt )QtKt +
(
λνbt−νktνbt
νkt
)
Qbt Bt = νntNt
⇒ (λ−νkt )QtKt +
(
(λ−νkt )λbλ
)
Qbt Bt = νntNt
⇒ (λ−νkt )QtKt + (λ−νkt )λbλ ςtQtKt = νntNt
⇒ QtKt = νnt
(λ−νkt )(1+ λbλ ςt )
Nt
⇒ QtKt+Q
b
t Bt
Nt
= νnt (1+ςt )
(λ−νkt )(1+ λbλ ςt )
≡φt
A.2 Equilibrium equations
Households
Wt =
χLφt
Uc,t
(A.1)
Uc,t = (Ct −hCt−1)−1−βhEt (Ct+1−hCt )−1 (A.2)
1= EtβΛt ,t+1Rt (A.3)
Λt ,t+1 =
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
(A.4)
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Intermediate Good Producers
Ymt = At (ξtKt−1)αL1−αt (A.5)
Rk,t+1 =
Pm,t+1α
Ym,t+1
Kt
+ (1−δ)Qt+1ξt+1
Qt
(A.6)
Wt = Pmt (1−α)Ymt
Lt
(A.7)
Capital Good Producers
Kt = (1−δ(Ut ))ξtKt−1+ It (A.8)
Qt = 1+ f
(
It
It−1
)
+ It
It−1
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
−EtβΛt ,t+1
(
It
It−1
)2
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
(A.9)
f
(
It
It−1
)
= ηi
2
(
It
It−1
−1
)2
(A.10)
Retailers
Π∗t =
²
²−1
Ft
Zt
Πt (A.11)
Ft = YtPmt +βγΛt ,t+1Π²t+1Π
−γp²
t Ft+1 (A.12)
Zt = Yt +βγΛt ,t+1Π²−1t+1Π
−γp (²−1)
t Zt+1 (A.13)
Ymt =∆p,tYt (A.14)
∆p,t = γ∆p,t−1Π²tΠ
−γp²
t−1 + (1−γ)
1−γΠ²−1t Π−γp (²−1)t−1
1−γ
 ²²−1 (A.15)
X t = 1
Pmt
(A.16)
Π1−²t = (1−γ)(Π∗t )1−²+γΠ
γp (1−²)
t−1 , (A.17)
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Banks
νk j t =λ
µ j t
1+µ j t
(A.18)
νb j t =λb
µ j t
1+µ j t
(A.19)
QtK j t =
νb j t −λb
λ−νk j t
Qbt B j t +
νn j t
λ−νk j t
N j t (A.20)
Ω j ,t ≡Λt−1,t ((1−θ)+θ(1+µ j t )νn j t ) (A.21)
νk j t =βEtΩ j t+1(Rk,t+1−Rt ) (A.22)
νb j t =βEtΩ j t+1(Rb,t+1−Rt ) (A.23)
νn j t =βEtΩ j t+1Rt (A.24)
φt ≡ νnt (1+ςt )
(λ−νkt )(1+ λbλ ςt )
= QtKt +Q
b
t Bt
Nt
(A.25)
QtKt +Qbt Bt =D t +Nt (A.26)
ςt =
Qbt Bt
QtKt
(A.27)
Not = θ
[
RktQt−1Kt−1+RbtQbt−1Bt−1−Rt−1D t−1
]
(A.28)
Nnt =ω
[
Qt−1Kt−1+Qbt−1Bt−1
]
(A.29)
ςt =
Qbt Bt
QtKt
(A.30)
Not = θ
[
RktQt−1Kt−1+RbtQbt−1Bt−1−Rt−1D t−1
]
(A.31)
Nnt =ω
[
Qt−1Kt−1+Qbt−1Bt−1
]
(A.32)
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Nt =Not +Nnt (A.33)
premt = EtRkt+1
Rt
(A.34)
Fiscal Policy
Gt =Geg t (A.35)
Tt = T +κb(Bt−1−B)+κg (Gt −G) (A.36)
Rb,t = (1−∆dt ∗D)
[
rc +ρcQbt
Qbt−1
]
(A.37)
Gt +Qbt Bt =RbtQbt−1Bt−1+Tt (A.38)
∆dt =
exp
(
η1+η2 Bt4Yt )
)
1+exp
(
η1+η2 Bt4Yt
) (A.39)
prembt =
EtRbt+1
Rt
(A.40)
Monetary Policy and Good Market Clearing
it = ρi it−1+ (1−ρ)(i +κpipit +κymˆc t )+²it (A.41)
1+ it =Rt EtPt+1
Pt
(A.42)
Yt =Ct + It + f
(
It
It−1
)
It +Gt (A.43)
Shock Processes
g t = ρg g t−1+²gt (A.44)
at = ρaat−1+²at (A.45)
ξt = ρξξt−1+²ξt (A.46)
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A.3 Decomposition of the output response to the shock
This section highlights, that the time-varying risk adjustment is indeed the main
reason for the difference between the third-order accurate impulse response of output
to the government spending shock and the first-order accurate impulse response
to the government spending shock. Figure (A.1) illustrates the contributions of the
different components of the policy function to the overall response of output to the
shock. For convenience, equation (3.47) is restated below
yt = y + 1
2
yσ2σ
2+
∞∑
i=0
(
yi + 1
2
yσ2i
σ2
)
²t−i + 1
2
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
yi , j (²t−i ⊗²t− j )
+1
6
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
yi , j ,k(²t−i ⊗²t− j ⊗²t−k),
where y denotes the vector of deterministic steady state values of the respective
endogenous variables, and the matrices of partial derivatives, yi , yi , j , yi , j ,k , yσ2 and
yσ2i
, are evaluated at the deterministic steady state. σ is a scale factor for the degree of
risk in the model, and ²t−i , ²t− j , and ²t−k are vectors of past realizations of shocks.
Figure A.1: Components of the output response to a shock in government spending of 1
percent of output.
92 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX
The left panel of the middle row of figure (A.1) depicts the first-order accurate
response to the realized government spending shock, which is captured by the
term
∑∞
i=0 yi²t−i in the policy function. Note, that the contribution of the first-order
component is at the scale of 10−3. The lower left panel depicts the contribution of the
time-varying risk adjustment term, 12
∑∞
i=0 yσ2i σ
2²t−i . Again, the contribution of this
term the third-order accurate impulse response is of the order 10−3. In contrast to
these terms, for the same impulse response, the contributions of the second-order
component, 12
∑∞
i=0
∑∞
j=0 yi , j (²t−i ⊗ ²t− j ) (depicted in the center panel), and the
third-order component, 16
∑∞
i=0
∑∞
j=0
∑∞
k=0 yi , j ,k(²t−i ⊗ ²t− j ⊗ ²t−k) (depicted in the
lower right panel), are of smaller magnitudes (10−4 and 10−5, respectively). Thus the
first-order component and the risk-adjustment are the dominating terms for the
third-order accurate impulse response.
The solid line in the upper panel of figure (A.1) shows the overall impulse re-
sponse of output to the government spending shock that is obtained with a
third-order approximation. Compared to the first-order accurate and the second-
order accurate impulse response it displays a weaker impact of the shock on output.
The lower left panel of figure (A.1) shows that this difference is due to the negative
contribution of the risk correction to first-order to the impact of the government
spending shock on output. This reflects the fact that in the face of the shock banks
reduce their exposure to the risky assets by more than in the linear setting, decreasing
the credit supply, investment and hence, output.
As the state-dependence of impulse responses, and the asymmetry between
responses to positive and negative shocks hinge on the second-order terms and the
third-order terms associated with realized shocks, they are very small, and I can
abstract from them in my analysis.
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